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Technical Efficiency and Economic Incentives
More U.S. workers die each year on the job than were killed in 
the U.S. military cumulatively from 1998 through November 2004, 
even after including self-inflicted and accidental military deaths (DIOR 
2005). In 2001, there were 8,786 job-related fatal injuries (5,900 not 
counting the fatalities caused by the terrorist attacks of September 11), 
or about 3.7 fatal injuries per 100,000 workers. Workers made 2.1 mil-
lion trips to the emergency room for injuries sustained from accidents 
at work (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2004). Workers’ 
compensation insurance, which covers all medical expenses and part 
of lost wages associated with injuries, cost employers $63.9 billion in 
2001 (Williams, Reno, and Burton 2003). The indirect costs of acci-
dents—lost wages, damage to equipment, and training and rehabilita-
tion expenses—were several times this amount.
Human resource management (HRM) is usually viewed as an aux-
iliary function in a firm, contributing nothing to that firm’s output—a 
cost tolerated because payroll, benefits, and certain types of human re-
source activity must be organized before the real job of production can 
be undertaken. But HRM practices can affect accident costs in three 
ways. Two of the three pertain to the real or intrinsic risk in the work-
place. “Real” risk is the level of physical danger of accidental injury 
or occupational disease that comes from workers producing output. As 
men interact with machines, both men and machines cause accidents. 
Accidents can be reduced by modifying either part of the interaction: 1) 
by increasing workers’ incentives to be careful, or 2) by modifying the 
workplace environment to employ processes, procedures, equipment, 
and ergonomics that reduce on-the-job injuries. In addition, HRM pol-
icy can reduce accident costs by lessening workers’ incentives to file 
false or inflated accident claims for any given level of real risk.
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Most models of firm behavior ignore HRM, assuming management 
simply chooses labor and capital to maximize firms’ profits. As the 
product price, the wage rate, or the rental cost of machinery changes, 
so do the optimal production of widgets and the optimal configuration 
of inputs. In these traditional models, labor is passive with respect to 
the production process in two ways: labor does nothing to improve the 
technical efficiency of the firm, and labor always acts in the firm’s best 
interest, regardless of labor’s own incentives. Management is assumed 
to know everything the workers know.
THE IMBALANCE CREATED BY ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION
But the traditional model is seriously flawed, as there is ample evi-
dence that workers are not passive. What workers know about their 
own behavior or about the firm’s technology may profoundly affect 
profitability. Costs may also rise because of excessive consumption 
of fringe benefits by employees when legitimate claims are difficult to 
distinguish from questionable claims. Or management may ignorantly 
be providing inferior plant design or unsafe production processes—re-
source misallocation that could be improved with labor’s help. Such 
asymmetric information, where employees know something that it is 
difficult or costly for management to know, can yield costs that are un-
necessarily high.
The collapse of the Enron Corporation is an example of how impor-
tant asymmetric information can be, though the information asymmetry 
there was largely between management and shareholders. Enron man-
agers and accountants deceived shareholders into believing the com-
pany was in much better financial shape than it actually was, having 
information about company debt and revenue that the general public 
did not have. This asymmetry of information was exploited by manage-
ment, inflating company stock value beyond its actual worth in order to 
increase management income and maintain management control.
 While asymmetric information problems between management 
and shareholders, such as happened at Enron, are a spectacular type 
of asymmetric information problem, such problems also exist between 
management and company employees. In most jobs it is impractical to 
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monitor all employee behavior. So employees know more about their 
work effort and level of care than managers do. Where such asymmetric 
information exists, questions arise: Are employees working as hard as 
they have agreed to work under the employment contract? Are the em-
ployees treating company property with the same respect and due care 
with which they would treat their own property, so that there is no thiev-
ery, vandalism, or misuse of company equipment? Are the employees 
being as safe as prudently possible? Are the employees only using sick 
days when they need to use them? Are the employees only filing lost-
work insurance claims for legitimate, on-the-job injuries? These are all 
areas where asymmetric information can drive a wedge between what 
management expects and what employees deliver.
HRM Practices Can Treat Asymmetric Information Problems
HRM practices are increasingly viewed as one way the firm can ad-
dress asymmetric information problems. The hypothesized causal link 
between HRM practices and a reduction in asymmetric information 
problems has HRM changing profits: HRM programs provide work-
ers with incentives to change their behavior by aligning their activities 
with management’s profit objective. Without these incentives, profits 
are lower.
This model cannot be tested in its entirety; too many model compo-
nents remain either unmeasured or unmeasurable. For example, asym-
metric information is not public information; it is not measured. Profits 
and even costs are not uniformly reported for all companies, especially 
for small and medium-sized companies such as we have in our sample. 
However, there is one important category of cost—safety costs—which 
is measured in sufficient detail to use in testing our model. The test is 
simple: do alternative HRM practices affect employees’ injury claims? 
Do some HRM practices help reduce injury-claim frequency? Do other 
HRM practices help reduce injury-claim severity? If they do reduce 
safety costs, is it because the HRM practices are improving technical 
efficiency or because HRM practices are reducing disability benefits 
consumption associated with asymmetric information?
In this book, we estimate how various HRM practices affect occu-
pational safety: which HRM practices lower firms’ workers’ compensa-
tion costs and whether their impact comes through changes in technical 
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efficiency or through induced changes in workers’ behavior. We present 
a model of safety outcomes in this chapter that illuminates the ways in 
which HRM might affect safety outcomes, and in the next chapter we 
use this model as a basis for reviewing the empirical research in this 
field. We present our own research findings in Chapters 3 and 4. In 
Chapter 5 we draw conclusions.
THE ACCIDENTS-OUTPUT TRADEOFF
Either improved technical efficiency or labor incentives will lower 
firms’ overall safety costs, including outlays for machinery, compen-
sating differentials for risk, and lost work time. Frequently we ignore 
the overall influence of safety. One long-recognized shortcoming of the 
simple classical model is that it fails to take into account that the firm 
produces not only output but accident claims with a given level of labor 
and capital inputs. That is to say, in real-world industrial processes, ac-
cidents are a natural by-product of production. Getting rid of all job ac-
cidents is often feasible only with very large reductions in output. Even 
white-collar workers occasionally bump their heads in their cubicles or 
get paper cuts that may become infected; wearing special headgear and 
thick mittens could prevent such accidents. We rarely wear headgear 
or mittens in the office because the reduction in productivity would 
outweigh any gains in safety. On the other hand, sometimes we can 
increase the level of output by ignoring prudent safety precautions—
such as by taking off the safety guards from machinery or removing the 
guardrails along catwalks and stairs that inhibit the movement of mate-
rials—but accident costs resulting from ignoring basic safety practices 
generally outweigh the additional output that would be garnered by do-
ing so. There is a tradeoff between accidents and output.1 
Another shortcoming of the classical model, mentioned earlier, is 
that the human factors in the production process are not passive—em-
ployees may react to incentives, and employees may provide valuable 
information about the optimal organization of production. For example, 
when construction workers show management how a wall can be framed 
more safely and quickly by assembling it horizontally on the ground, 
rather than piecing it together vertically in the air, they provide valuable 
information on the technical efficiency of the process. Because workers 
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are assembling products every day and building techniques are con-
stantly changing, opportunities for uncovering such technical efficien-
cies are abundant. When HRM practices lead to improved techniques of 
production, technical efficiency improves. Accident prevention costs, 
broadly defined, fall. 
HRM Practices Can Also Treat Safety Behavior Problems
Likewise, variations in HRM practices may change worker safety 
behavior and the firm’s safety costs. Consider the time path of injury 
benefits, shown in Figure 1.1, typical of workers’ compensation laws 
in most states—including Minnesota, from which we draw our sample 
for this study.     
  
The first three days following the injury are known as the waiting 
period in workers’ compensation. (It is three days in Minnesota; other 
common waiting periods are five and seven days.) During the waiting 
period, the injured worker receives no lost wage benefits, though all of 
the injury-related medical costs are covered by the firm’s workers’ com-
pensation insurance policy. Hence, during the waiting period there are 
only payments for medical treatments. After the waiting period, two-
thirds of the worker’s lost wages are replaced by indemnity payments 
(payments for lost wages, in addition to the medical payments). Both 
the waiting period and the partial wage replacement are types of insur-
ance cost sharing. Insurance contracts are structured so that whenever a 
worker is injured, he bears part of the wage-loss risk.
Figure 1.1  Time Path of Injury Benefits
Medical-only 
payments
Two-thirds of lost wages replaced 
by workers’ compensation insurance
Date of injury Waiting period   Time since injury
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THE PERILS OF MORAL HAZARD
Cost sharing, such as waiting periods and partial wage replacement, 
mitigates incentive problems under asymmetric information. Behavior-
al changes resulting from incentives generated by disability and health 
insurance coverage are known as moral hazard. In other words, moral 
hazard exists when workers (or firms or health care providers) change 
behavior for personal gain under an insurance contract. 
There are many actions an insured worker or health care provider 
can take that affect the size or the probability of a loss.2 With respect to 
injuries that are temporarily disabling, for example, an insurance con-
tract may specify that the only disabilities covered are those arising 
from injuries sustained while on the job. Hence, a worker may claim a 
given condition arose from a job injury and may seek temporary total 
disability benefits because his real health condition does not qualify un-
der the contract. Or, the worker may have a recurring health condition, 
such as lower back pain, which in the absence of insurance he simply 
tolerates, since treatment would impose personal costs. When insured, 
however, he may choose not to work and incur health service costs and 
draw disability benefits since others are paying the benefits. An extreme 
case of behavioral change might be overt fraud in which a worker—fac-
ing a pending layoff—claims injury benefits when no injury or health 
condition was incurred, either on or off the job.
Insurance contracts recognize that moral hazard is costly. If insurers 
or firms had full information about all workplace injuries, they could 
reimburse workers for all lost wages until those workers returned to 
work. Under full information, the firm would know what injuries were 
work-related and the firm would know exactly when the worker was 
able to return to work. But firms don’t usually have such information. 
Monitoring the behavior of all participants in an insurance contract is 
costly, and the costs of such monitoring generally exceed the benefits. 
The workers know this, and since they have considerable latitude in 
changing their behavior to enhance their short-run well-being, they 
sometimes behave differently than they would in the absence of insur-
ance payments. Therefore, the root of the moral hazard problem is an 
information asymmetry between workers and firms—workers know 
more about their own health status, as well as their preference for lei-
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sure over work (hence their willingness to feign injury if it results in 
paid leisure time), than firms know. 
Workers’ compensation insurance recognizes the complex incen-
tives generated by disability coverage and alters the benefits contract 
so workers bear some of the costs of the injury themselves. They get no 
lost-wage pay during the waiting period and only partial reimbursement 
thereafter. These cost-sharing arrangements exist to induce workers to 
take an appropriate amount of care on the work site and only the neces-
sary time off work. HRM practices can affect those incentives.
An Illustrative Model of Three Cases of Worker Reimbursement
Consider a small construction company (Table 1.1A,B,C). Initially 
assume the firm’s policy is to allow sick-day pay to reimburse work-
ers for lost wages during the waiting period. We will call this the usual 
case. We also assume a simple fixed input-output process (a Leontief 
technology) that requires five laborers to construct a building.3 Only 
construction workers actually build; the foremen supervise workers and 
help replace the labor services of injured construction workers. We as-
sume the rate of building depends only on the number of construction 
laborers, but the rate of concomitant accidents varies with the degree of 
care exercised by the workers and the supervising foremen. 
Since output is fixed, the firm’s economic problem is to minimize 
the sum of labor costs and safety costs. In this example, each foreman 
is paid $100,000 and each construction laborer is paid $40,000. Each 
accident costs $30,000 in terms of replacement labor and capital costs. 
These are the only costs associated with on-the-job accidents. Initial-
ly, suppose a workers’ compensation system is in place that only pays 
some of the lost wages after the waiting period, though the firm’s HRM 
practices allow workers to use their sick-day benefits to replace their 
lost wages for the first three days following an injury. Hence, injured 
workers bear some costs of workplace injuries, though not any costs 
associated with the waiting period. 
Table 1.1A is the usual case, before any changes in standard HRM 
practices are implemented. Our assumed Leontief technology is such 
that with the number of laborers fixed, the output is fixed, and there is 
no substitution between foremen and laborers in building production. 
While adding more foremen doesn’t increase the number of buildings, 
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it does lower the number of accidents. Foremen monitor the safety con-
tent of work, and with more foremen present, safety costs fall, although 
at a diminishing rate. Since output is fixed, the firm maximizes its prof-
its by minimizing the costs. 
The tradeoff in Table 1.1A is simple: more foremen reduce accident 
costs but increase wage costs. The firm’s optimal allocation rule will 
be to add foremen until the marginal cost of the additional foremen (in 
terms of the increase in wage costs) is greater than the marginal benefit 
of the additional foremen (in terms of the reduction in safety costs). In 
Table 1.1A, the cost-minimizing level of output is produced by going 
with two foremen. Going from one foreman to two increases the wage 
costs by $100,000 while it reduces the number of accidents from eight 
to four, saving $120,000 in accident costs. However, going from two 
foremen to three increases overall costs: wage costs rise by $100,000 
while accident costs only fall by $90,000.
Even though the firm could construct its buildings without any acci-
dents by hiring five foremen, it does not choose to do so. The additional 
costs (in terms of foremen’s wages) do not justify the additional gains 
from producing with no injuries. It is not optimal to reduce the injuries 
to zero. Indeed, in each of the three cases we examine in Table 1.1, it is 
cheaper to allow some injuries than it is to do away with all injuries.
HRM Practices Can Worsen Incentive or Moral Hazard Problems
Suppose that we change HRM policy, but in a way that provides 
fewer incentives for workers to take care. Specifically, suppose that the 
new HRM policy guarantees that all lost wages due to an injury will 
be reimbursed, not just those of the initial waiting period, without time 












1 5 8 300,000 240,000 540,000
2 5 4 400,000 120,000 520,000a
3 5 1 500,000 30,000 530,000
5 5 0 700,000 0 700,000
a Optimal cost-benefit level.
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limitation or a financial cap to the total benefits received: the company 
makes up any difference between the employees’ wages and workers’ 
compensation benefits through a wage continuation policy that guaran-
tees that 100 percent of the worker’s nominal wage will be replaced. 
With their pay as high on a workers’ compensation claim as it is on 
the job, 1) workers could take more risks on the job than they formerly 
did when they bore some of the wage costs of an accident, changing 
their real safety behavior, or 2) workers might simply report more ac-
cidents than they formerly did, given the same level of risk. The former 
is called risk-bearing moral hazard; the latter, claims-reporting moral 
hazard (Butler and Worrall 1991). As the workers’ insurance coverage 
under the new HRM policy expands, moral hazard potential increases 
and the number of reported claims rises. 
An example of this rise in injury rates, holding the level of monitor-
ing constant, is given in Table 1.1B. While the output remains constant 
at the same level it did in Table 1.1A, the accidents double for each 
combination of laborers and foremen. With one foreman and five labor-
ers, the number of reported accidents goes from eight with normal care 
to 16 when laborers take less care because of moral hazard response. 
As the number of reported injuries doubles, the value of additional fore-
men increases. In Table 1.1A, going from one to two foremen decreases 
accident costs by $120,000; in Table 1.1B, going from one to two fore-
men decreases accident costs by $240,000. Because the marginal cost 
of foremen stays constant, the increased marginal benefit of additional 
foremen increases the firm’s demand for their monitoring activity, and 
the optimal number of foremen rises. In Table 1.1B the potential for 
moral hazard behavior has increased, and the optimal number of fore-
men has risen from two to three. 
Finally, as a direct result of the increase in the moral hazard under 
the new HRM policy reflected in Table 1.1B, there are more claims, so 
safety costs are higher for every combination of input (except for where 
there are five foremen; here the costs remain zero).
HRM Practices Can Also Improve Incentive or Moral Hazard 
Problems 
Suppose that instead of “topping off” disability benefits so there 
were no wages lost when workers were injured, the firm adopted a 
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policy that moved in a different direction: it adopted the HRM prac-
tices of Table 1.1A with respect to disability benefits (only two-thirds 
of the wage is replaced following an injury), but now it has added a 
profit-sharing plan in which it distributes 10 percent of the company’s 
profits to workers. Especially for a small company where workers can 
more readily monitor each other and apply peer pressure (so there is 
less likely to be a free rider response that mitigates the financial incen-
tives), this is likely to align employees’ incentives with management’s 
profit-maximizing efforts.4 We may suppose employees respond to such 
profit-sharing incentives by being more careful on the job or simply by 
filing fewer claims than in Tables 1.1A and 1.1B.
In Table 1.1C, the input combinations are the same as those in Ta-
bles 1.1A and 1.1B, but there are fewer accidents that result at each 
level of input: Table 1.1C input combinations now have only half the 
accident rates of Table 1.1A, and only one-fourth the accident rates of 
Table 1.1B. Total costs are naturally lower for each combination of 
inputs, and marginal benefits of monitoring are lowered as well. Go-
ing from one foreman to two reduces accident costs by only $60,000, 
but it costs $100,000 in additional salary to obtain this reduction: the 
marginal benefits from safety monitoring have fallen, but the marginal 
costs stayed the same. Hence, less monitoring is optimal and only one 
foreman will be hired to work with the five laborers. If we assume that 
company revenue is $520,000, this implies profit sharing of $10,000 
with one foreman (10 percent of profits = [$520,000 − $420,000] × 0.1), 
$6,000 with two foremen, and $500 with three foremen. This minimizes 
total costs at $420,000, given the new worker incentives induced by 
the HRM changes. Indeed, in the absence of profit sharing, the firm 
Table 1.1B  Moral Hazard Response: Full Wage Replacement Benefits 











1 5 16 300,000 480,000 780,000
2 5 8 400,000 240,000 640,000
3 5 2 500,000 60,000 560,000a
5 5 0 700,000 0 700,000
a Optimal cost-benefit level.
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would revert to Table 1.1A outcomes and total costs would increase by 
$90,000 (accounting for the profit-sharing payout).
HRM Practices Can Improve or Worsen Technical Efficacy
While the examples in Table 1.1 focused on workers’ incentives 
(through risk-bearing and claims-reporting moral hazard) as HRM prac-
tices changed, those tables could just as well have represented changes 
in production efficiency (through physical ergonomic changes) induced 
by changes in HRM practices. If a change in HRM practices discour-
aged communications between worker and firm, it could worsen tech-
nical efficiency, and the results could be those pictured in Table 1.1B. 
For example, if HRM practices included safety standards that didn’t im-
prove safety but limited productivity—say, wearing thin, slippery silk 
gloves when handling power equipment in an effort to reduce carpal 
tunnel syndrome—then the change in HRM practices could conceiv-
ably increase accident costs. On the other hand, if the implementation 
of new HRM practices improves communications between the worker 
and the firm in a way that results in fewer accidents for each level of 
output, then costs would tend to change as they did in Table 1.1C. As-
sembling some components on the ground and then hauling them into 
place might be one such improvement. Changes in assembly sequenc-
ing, tool usage, and even product design might be other such improve-
ments.













1 5 4 300,000 120,000 420,000a
2 5 2 400,000 60,000 460,000
3 5 0.5b 500,000 15,000 515,000
5 5 0 700,000 0 700,000
a Optimal cost-benefit level. Assuming total revenue is $520,000, total costs including 
profit sharing are $430,000, $466,000, $515,500, and $700,000, depending on number 
of foremen. 
b Represents one accident every other period.
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The discussion of Table 1.1 illustrates the issues addressed in this 
book: the extent to which changes in HRM practices change accident 
costs, which HRM practices are most effective, and whether those re-
sult in moral hazard changes or changes in technical efficiency. In a 
world of perfect certainty and full information, the firm would always 
adopt those HRM practices that were optimal, producing the best com-
bination of technical efficiency and economic incentives. So any expan-
sion of a practice, or adoption of a new practice, would result in lower 
accident costs, given that output was held constant. But the optimal 
combination might not always be obvious to firms because of informa-
tional asymmetries, contract restrictions, poor management incentives, 
or inept bureaucratic procedures. In this study, we address these issues 
using a sample of Minnesota firms. We chose firms from that state be-
cause we have extensive data on their workers’ compensation costs as 
well as their HRM practices. Using this sample, we hope to estimate 
not only which HRM practices are most cost-effective, but also whether 
they reduce costs through a reduction in moral hazard or an increase in 
technical efficiency.
Notes
 1.  See Walter Oi (1974) for an extensive analysis of this tradeoff.
 2. See Butler, Gardner, and Gardner (1997) for empirical examples and citations to 
the empirical safety literature.
 3. Wassily Leontief, a Nobel laureate in economics, pioneered the use of produc-
tion functions where the ratios of inputs to outputs were fixed so there was no 
substitution between inputs. This type of production has been used extensively 
in short-term business forecasting and production planning.
 4. The free rider problem arises when one worker does not incur the costs of tak-
ing care, thinking that all other workers will take care instead. Thus he is a “free 
rider” in that he doesn’t incur the costs but plans to enjoy the benefits (the extra 
profits) generated when others take care.
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Prior Studies of Human 
Resource Management and Safety
The description at the end of Chapter 1 makes it clear that not all 
human resource management (HRM) changes necessarily improve 
safety. HRM policies implemented to eliminate all cost sharing associ-
ated with injuries, while they do remove income risk for workers, also 
lessen their safety incentive. An example would be policies that ensured 
that employees on workers’ compensation claims made as much money 
as they would at work. Profit sharing, on the other hand, might increase 
employees’ safety awareness. In this chapter, we review prior analyses 
of how various HRM practices affect safety to get a better idea of which 
practices improve safety and which do not.
The workplace environment affects safety not only directly, through 
the provision of safety procedures and ergonomic equipment, but also 
indirectly, through interpersonal relationships and incentives generated 
by human resource policy. Certainly, work can be stressful, and this can 
harm workers’ health. Since the early days of scientific work manage-
ment (Taylor 1947), workers have reported job dissatisfaction, psycho-
logical stress, and injuries (Walker and Guest 1952). As office work 
becomes automated, health problems and work-related diseases con-
tinue to be important issues in industrial relations and human resources 
(Smith et al. 1981). Some researchers believe that stress results from 
new organizational practices: loss of task control at work, scheduling 
demands, greater specialization, increased electronic monitoring, and 
job insecurity (Cooper and Smith 1985; Cyert and Mowery 1988; Maj-
chrzak 1988; Smith et al. 1981, 1992). Research has accumulated on the 
relationship between the work environment and stress-related diseases 
such as mental health and heart disease (Cooper and Marshall 1976; 
House 1981; Karasek 1979; Kasl 1978; Smith 1981, 1987). Recently 
there has been increased interest in the effect of workplace organiza-
tion on the incidence of cumulative trauma disease (Moon and Sauter 
1996).
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These modern trends—and the press of domestic and international 
competition—force companies to adopt new technologies, attempt new 
management practices, and make use of new models of work organiza-
tion (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; Cappelli et 
al. 1997; Levine and Tyson 1990). Prominent among the changes are 
human resource management (HRM) practices that provide employees 
with participation rights in the decision-making process and financial 
ownership rights in the firm. While these high-performance HRM prac-
tices have attracted the attention of practitioners and researchers, previ-
ous research has largely been limited to how work organization practic-
es affect firm productivity and profitability. Little is known about how 
the new HRM practices affect work safety; only a few studies have es-
timated how management culture influences workplace accident costs.1 
The research reported in this study examines all three dimensions of 
this HRM revolution: worker involvement in decision making, worker 
involvement in financial returns, and management involvement in the 
firm’s safety process (i.e., management safety culture).
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING
Employee participation in decision making may increase informa-
tion about optimal policies. Granting employees the right to participate 
in the firm’s strategic safety policy—for example, increasing worker 
involvement in the design and implementation of safety policy—may 
improve workplace safety for both informational and psychological 
reasons. Employee involvement in strategic planning usually occurs on 
company time, so employees are essentially acting as paid consultants. 
In this role, workers may cost-effectively identify safety improvements. 
Workers are more intimately involved with risky production process-
es—including other workers’ responses to those processes—and so 
can identify and monitor risk at a lower cost than firm managers or 
outside consultants (Eaton and Nocerino 2000; Shannon et al. 1996). 
Involvement with the introduction of new production technologies al-
lows workers to voice their concerns about risk exposure during the 
decision-making process. This may reduce turnover, increase worker 
morale, and maintain the firm’s stock of specific human capital—all of 
which may enhance safety outcomes.
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A second benefit from employee involvement is that workers pick 
up information about workplace risk. Workers’ getting more informa-
tion concerning job risk and the firm’s safety efforts will help reduce un-
certainty in their minds and thus increase the value of the employment 
experience for risk-averse workers. This lowers employment costs and 
may improve worker productivity to the extent that safety behaviors 
depend upon workers’ attitudes and improved morale leads to higher 
productivity.
Another psychological benefit for workers of having meaningful 
involvement in planning the firm’s safety policy is that they begin to 
take ownership of safety outcomes, increasing their commitment to the 
program’s successful implementation. This would also be expected to 
improve safety. 
We measure this participation effect both through a numerical count 
of the types of decision-making activities the firm allows its workers 
to participate in (the extensive participation margin) and the degree of 
participation in those activities (the intensive participation margin). We 
expect greater involvement in either dimension will improve safety out-
comes. 
Another control variable measures the extent of information sharing 
that the firm engages in with workers concerning company finances, 
human resource planning, and workplace safety. Again, for reasons dis-
cussed in this section, we anticipate that as information sharing by the 
firm increases, safety will increase.
Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford (1995) find in a survey of Fortune 
1000 companies that 55 percent of the firms in 1987 and 48 percent of 
the firms in 1990 had improved workplace safety and health as a re-
sult of employee participation. Quantifying the magnitude of employee 
participation and the information employees contribute is not always 
easy, as other influences must be taken into account. Not only is the 
presence of one of these three dimensions of employee involvement 
(company finances, human resource planning, and workplace safety) 
likely to be correlated with the other two, but firms with employees in-
volved in decision making are more likely to have employees involved 
in financial returns. Employee decision making may also be associated 
with the age of the workforce or the extent of workforce unionization. 
Since several correlated factors are simultaneously determining safety 
outcomes, to sort out the influence of any particular type of program re-
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quires multivariate controls for other types of programs and workforce 
demographics. 
Regression analysis takes into account the influence of other fac-
tors included in the model. Definitive interpretation of prior research 
is hobbled in two ways: 1) one or more of the key HRM practices is 
omitted from examination (no prior study includes employee participa-
tion in both decision making and financial returns as well as measures 
of management safety culture), and 2) the variables are often examined 
in a univariate, rather than a multivariate, framework.
Past Research on HRM Practices
Shannon et al. (1996) is an example of a study limited in both of 
these ways. It doesn’t have any variables on employees’ involvement 
with the company’s financial returns, and it doesn’t present the results 
of the analysis in a multivariate framework. The researchers examine 
a matched sample of questionnaires sent to firms in Ontario with data 
on those firms’ lost-time frequency rates (equivalent to the analysis of 
claim frequency given below). Survey questionnaires include respons-
es from both workers and management. The paper discusses only uni-
variate statistical analyses that compare various workplace practices to 
whether a firm has a low, medium, or high claim frequency. A multivari-
ate regression analysis is mentioned but not reported on in the paper. 
As discussed above, the absence of information about workers’ in-
volvement in financial returns makes it difficult to interpret the univariate 
correlations between safety outcomes and worker involvement in deci-
sion making. We must keep these cautions in mind when looking at stud-
ies like Shannon et al. (1996), which reports that lower claim frequency 
is associated with greater employee involvement in the firm’s strategic 
decisions on safety. Specifically, claim frequency was lower where the 
level of worker participation was judged high, either by the workers or 
by the management. We took particular interest in the close agreement 
between workers’ and managers’ rankings of the relative importance of 
the various safety dimensions surveyed. Such close agreement in that 
survey suggests that our survey, which asked questions of senior human 
resource management, may have elicited much the same response if the 
questions had been asked of workers instead of managers.
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Habeck, Hunt, and VanTol (1998), Habeck et al. (1998), Hunt and 
Habeck (1993), and Hunt et al. (1993)—extending the earlier research 
of Habeck (1993), Habeck, Leahy, and Hunt (1988), and Habeck et 
al. (1991)—relate the disability outcomes of 220 Michigan firms to 
those firms’ HRM practices. This research is the first serious analysis 
of how management safety culture affects injury claims. In addition 
to collecting survey information for the 220 firms, Hunt et al. (1993) 
held extensive interviews with 32 of the 220 firms and find a qualita-
tive difference in those firms that engage in what the researchers call a 
“participative culture.” In other words, they find a qualitative difference 
between firms that facilitate employee involvement in decision making 
and those where the employees do not participate in the firm’s decision 
making. 
To capture the richness of the survey responses from the quanti-
tative part of their investigation, Hunt and Habeck (1993) use factor 
analysis to create eight HRM policies and practices into which the re-
sponses fall. One of these factors, “people-oriented culture,” is largely 
about employee involvement in firm decision making. Of the 12 vari-
ables loading into this factor, seven pertain to employee involvement or 
information sharing with employees:
1) “Working relationships are collaborative and cooperative in this 
company.”
2) “Employees are formally included in the company’s goal-setting 
and planning process.”
3) “The company achieves open communications, where employees 
feel free to raise issues and concerns or to make suggestions.”
4) “The company shares information with employees about the fi-
nancial status and the productivity needs of the company.”
5) “Management seeks and considers employee input in company 
decisions.”
6) “Employee involvement programs, such as quality circles and 
labor-management participation teams, are used to generate 
employee participation in company operations.”
7) “Workers have some control over work process and productivity 
demands.”
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This factor is not statistically significant in Hunt and Habeck’s 
(1993) multivariate regression, but the results are suggestive: a 10 per-
cent increase in this people-oriented culture variable is associated with 
a 4.2 percent reduction in lost workdays rate, as predicted by our model. 
This analysis focuses only on claim frequency, so the authors do not 
report any analysis of claim severity. Our results on claim frequency 
support the analyses of both Hunt and Habeck (1993) and Hunt et al. 
(1993), and suggest little or no effect of involvement in decision mak-
ing on claim duration. Their findings with respect to management cul-
ture variables (the focus of their study) will be discussed below. 
Eaton and Nocerino (2000) examine the impact of safety commit-
tees on injury claims in the New Jersey public sector. They find that the 
existence of a safety committee is associated with higher injury rates 
and speculate that this is probably because safety committees were 
initially established in workplaces that were the most dangerous. This 
sort of endogeneity may also explain the results of Fairris and Brenner 
(2001), who find that quality circles are associated with higher report-
ed incidents of cumulative trauma injuries in an analysis of firms with 
three-digit SIC codes, whose firm-specific data on quality circles was 
matched with industry aggregates. (Teams and total quality manage-
ment proved statistically insignificant in the analysis.)
While Eaton and Nocerino (2000) find the existence of safety com-
mittees associated with higher injury claim rates, they also find that 
greater worker involvement in safety committees leads to better safety 
outcomes. This is consistent with our expectations concerning employ-
ee decision making, including both the number of dimensions (decision 
making, financial returns, and safety process) that workers participate 
in and the degree of that participation.
Rooney (1992) finds that employee participation in decision making 
lowered the incidence of one or more Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) reportable injuries in his sample of 85 firms, 
although his analysis excludes firm characteristics and workers’ aver-
age wages.
Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996) find that wood product 
firms with higher levels of worker decision making did no better than 
those with less worker decision making, contrary to the authors’ ex-
pectations. One of the problems identified by the authors is that their 
sample of employee-owned firms also comprised the firms with the 
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most precarious employment outlooks, so their measure of worker de-
cision making may have been confounded with the effects of expected 
downsizing (which, for moral hazard reasons, may increase reported 
claims). Moreover, the authors’ use of workers’ self-reports on firms’ 
safety may also have led to biased recall: conventional wood-product 
mill workers seemed to underreport their accidents, while cooperative 
workers seemed to overreport their accidents.
Rooney (1992) and Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996) com-
pare employee-owned firms, in which employees are involved in both 
decision making and the firms’ financial returns, with firms that are not 
employee-owned, in which neither type of participation takes place. The 
differential effects of decision-making participation relative to financial-
returns participation are not separated. Unlike the Rooney (1992) and 
Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996) studies, Park (1997) estimates 
employees’ participation effects by type, with one dummy variable 
indicating any involvement in the firm’s financial return and another 
dummy variable indicating any involvement in the firm’s decision mak-
ing. The separation of these effects is theoretically desirable, although 
Park’s empirical implementation is somewhat crude: these dummies 
distinguish neither the types nor the extent of participation within these 
broad groups. For example, a firm with only a suggestion system would 
receive the same value as a firm with total quality management, joint 
labor-management committees, and an employee representative on the 
board of directors.
Park merges Minnesota workers’ compensation claims with survey 
data from the Minnesota Human Resource Management Practice file, 
developed at the Industrial Relations Center at the University of Min-
nesota. He finds that employee participation in decision making lowers 
the injury claim rate, as our model suggests, but that the reduction is not 
statistically significant.
Baril and Berthelette (2000) analyze correlates of early return to 
work for a sample of Quebec workers’ compensation claims. Their 
qualitative analysis draws upon detailed interviews with 16 firms. 
Though no formal statistical analysis is drawn from these interviews, 
there appears to be a consensus among those interviewed that health 
and safety committees facilitate earlier returns to work, as does infor-
mation sharing by management. However, the authors report that some 
types of worker involvement actually impeded returns to work: returns 
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to work fell when rigid union seniority rules made it difficult to reassign 
workers to new jobs, and returns to work fell in firms where multiple 
unions were present. Multiple unions seem to impede temporary job 
reassignments for injured workers.
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN FINANCIAL RETURNS
Employees’ participation in the financial returns of the company 
will change their safety incentives, but not unambiguously. Whether or 
not employees take appropriate precaution against injury risk depends 
in part on the incentives they have to do so, including the extent to 
which they will bear the cost of failing to take care. This is one reason 
that workers’ compensation benefits do not fully replace lost wages. 
Since the claimant bears some of the lost wage costs, he has greater 
incentive to take care before an accident occurs and a greater incentive 
to return to work once an accident has taken place. Incentives are im-
portant because in many workplace accidents information is asymmet-
ric: claimants’ return-to-work capability is difficult to observe directly; 
often the injured worker knows more about his work ability than does 
the firm.
If employees take advantage of this informational asymmetry by 
changing their behavior because of insurance coverage, there is said to 
be moral hazard. For example, the extent of back pain is generally as-
sessed through a worker’s self-report of pain. If that worker’s disability 
benefits were as high as his wages, and the worker didn’t like either his 
job or his work supervisor, he might choose to stay away from the job 
longer after the onset of back pain symptoms than he would in the ab-
sence of insurance coverage. Partial insurance coverage, as is discussed 
above, is one way insurance attempts to limit such moral hazard, by 
making the insured employee bear some of the cost of being away from 
work. 
Another mechanism for limiting worker moral hazard would be to 
involve the worker in the firm’s financial returns. Employee participa-
tion in financial returns is measured by the number of programs through 
which the worker shares in the financial outcomes of the firm. To the 
extent that involvement with the firm’s financial returns affects workers’ 
expected income, they will tend to be more cautious if they can increase 
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the firm’s profits (and hence their income) by doing so. In experience-
rated firms, for example, workers could reduce insurance premiums by 
filing fewer claims and could lower training costs and minimize reduc-
tions in output by missing fewer days of work.
Moral hazard may also be a problem with the firm: experience rat-
ing of the firm’s insurance premiums (where a firm’s future premiums 
depend on the current claims, so that higher-than-expected claims raise 
premiums) may induce firms to deny more claims than they would in 
the absence of experience rating, in order to reduce their insurance costs 
and increase their profitability. Sharing those profits with the employees 
through financial participation rights lowers the incentive for firms to 
engage in such moral hazard behavior as well.
Involving workers in the firm’s financial returns also increases work-
ers’ willingness to provide information concerning effective changes in 
HRM policy and practice. To the extent that this increases the returns to 
safety investments, or lowers the costs of safety investments, accidents 
will fall. The demand for safety outcomes may also increase if par-
ticipation in financial returns increases workers’ wealth and thus lowers 
their willingness to bear workplace risk.
However, an increase in financial returns may increase accidents 
as well. If bearing more risk increases the expected profitability of the 
firm more than the perceived costs (i.e., working without a possibly 
cumbersome safety guard, or working long hours without rest), then the 
employee may actually have less incentive to take care, and injuries and 
injury claims may rise.
Finally, participation in financial returns may be ineffective in low-
ering workplace safety costs because of the free rider problem: if each 
worker perceives that his contribution to firm safety is negligible and if 
safety maintenance is costly, he will let others take care while he does 
not. But to the extent that others feel this way, no one takes care, and 
the effects of employee participation on safety outcomes will be muted. 
Employees will ride for free by benefiting from the system without con-
tributing to it. For example, workers with lower back pain might not file 
a claim if they thought they would bear the full costs of the claim. But 
if they were to realize that they would gain the full benefits but share 
(indirectly) in only a fraction of the costs, they would file. So if the ex-
tent of ownership is too small to overcome the free rider problem, moral 
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hazard claims may be filed even if there is some involvement with the 
financial returns of the company.
Employee participation in decision making may help to diminish 
the free rider potential by increasing workers’ involvement and lower-
ing the incentive for workers to engage in opportunistic behaviors: if 
employees’ financial participation increases peer monitoring pressures, 
for example, free riding may be reduced.
Most research on employees’ financial involvement with the firm 
centers on comparisons of employee-owned firms with firms in which 
the employee has no ownership interests; the research ignores other 
forms of employee involvement in the company’s financial returns. 
Rooney (1992) and Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996), as re-
ported in the last section, compare employee-owned firms that had 
employee participation in decision making with firms that lacked em-
ployee participation in financial returns or decision making. Rooney 
(1992) finds that employee ownership (along with employee participa-
tion in decision making, as discussed in the last section) lowered the 
incidence of one or more OSHA-reportable injuries among companies 
in his sample of 85 firms. Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996) find 
that wood product firms with employee ownership had no better safety 
outcomes than those without employee ownership. These researchers 
could not disentangle the effects of participation in financial returns 
from participation in decision making, and they only examined one di-
mension of participation in financial returns: whether or not the firm 
was employee-owned. In addition, these analyses don’t control for any 
firm characteristics (though Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg [1996] 
match firms in their sample) and may suffer from recall bias and sample 
selection bias, as noted in the previous section.
Unlike the Rooney (1992) and Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg 
(1996) studies, Park (1997) distinguishes between decision-making 
participation and financial-returns participation in his study of Minne-
sota workers’ compensation claims. Unexpectedly, Park found that em-
ployee participation in financial returns increased the injury rate, as did 
the interaction between financial returns and decision making. That is, 
as employee participation in the firm’s financial returns rose, so did the 
injury rate, and the injury rate rose even more in firms with employee 
participation both in the firm’s financial returns and in the firm’s deci-
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sion making. This is contrary to our theoretical expectations, as given 
above.2
In an analysis of 117 California firms, Hakala (1994) reports that 
workers’ compensation experience modification fell as the degree of 
employee ownership increased. However, a firm’s experience modifi-
cation—an adjustment in its premiums according to whether the firm’s 
losses are above or below the mean level in its risk class—depends 
on a firm’s risk classification, making interclassification comparisons 
tenuous. Since the number of firm-level control variables is minimal 
in Hakala’s research (as it is in Rooney’s [1992] research), the findings 
need to be interpreted with caution.
MANAGEMENT SAFETY CULTURE 
Management safety culture means the employer’s commitment and 
leadership in making a safer workplace environment. In this research, 
our empirical measure of management safety culture is a Likert scale 
index of responses to the following issues:3
1)  management’s support for clear goals and objectives on safety 
and health policy, 
2)  management’s leadership in setting goals on safety and health,
3)  management’s interest in safety and health issues as a part of 
the firm’s strategic level of decision making,
4)  management’s willingness to share safety-related information 
with employees, and
5)  management’s commitment to reemployment of disabled work-
ers and a return-to-work program for injured employees.
An increase in management safety culture should have the same im-
pact on safety outcomes as an increase in worker participation in safety 
decision making, for similar reasons: as more management resources 
are employed toward integrating safety within overall corporate strat-
egy—and as more ways are found to minimize post-injury return-to-
work hurdles—accident costs will be reduced. To the extent this hap-
pens, the returns to safety investments increase, the level of job safety 
rises, and time away from work because of injuries falls. Higher values 
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of our measure of management safety culture should be associated with 
greater safety outcomes.
Improved management safety culture has been shown to be associ-
ated with lower accident rates in some industries. Moses and Savage 
(1992, 1994) analyze the Federal Highway Administration’s audit ques-
tions asked of all truck and bus companies. This audit consists of 57 
yes-or-no questions that are used to rate carriers as satisfactory, unsat-
isfactory, or conditional. Unsatisfactory ratings trigger educational ef-
forts and an additional, more detailed audit. Among the variables most 
predictive of accident rates are questions concerning the management 
safety culture of the carriers: Moses and Savage find that the lowest 
accident rates occur among carriers whose senior management report 
they are concerned with safety and communicate that concern to their 
employees.
Habeck et al. (1991) find that firms practicing poor disability man-
agement techniques had twice as many OSHA-recordable injuries but 
four times as many workers’ compensation claims as firms practicing 
effective disability management. Hunt and Habeck (1993) reach a simi-
lar conclusion in their noted study of 220 Michigan companies. They 
find that management diligence concerning workplace safety, and poli-
cies providing for a proactive return to work, are associated with fewer 
disability claims and shorter disability durations. In particular, Hunt and 
Habeck’s (1993) “Active Safety Leadership” factor focuses on many of 
the same elements as does our management safety culture; indeed, all 
13 of the variables loading into this factor directly or indirectly deal 
with management safety culture as we have defined it.4 The authors 
find that as Active Safety Leadership increases by 10 percent, claim 
frequency falls by 5.7 percent, a decline that is statistically significant. 
Our results on claim frequency support Habeck and Hunt’s analysis, 
though our estimated response is larger than theirs. Moreover, we also 
find quantitatively large and statistically significant responses in claim 
severity, which reinforce the effect of lower claim frequency. 
Hunt et al. (1993) also find that neither efforts to enhance wellness 
in workers nor ergonomic solutions prove to be effective in improving 
disability outcomes. In fact, ergonomic solutions to prevent injury and 
subsequent disability actually result in slightly higher disability rates. 
Although the result is odd, it is not statistically significant.
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Shannon et al. (1996) report that lower claim frequency is associ-
ated with more management involvement in the firm’s safety process. 
Specifically, claim frequency is lowest where management safety cul-
ture is strongest: where health and safety responsibilities are part of the 
manager’s job description, where health and safety are an important 
part of his annual salary review, and where senior management attend 
the firm’s health and safety committee meetings. That is to say, claim 
frequency is lower where management perceives itself—and is per-
ceived by workers—as doing an effective job in supervision, and where 
management ranks health and safety as a high moral concern.
Claim frequency is also lower in the Shannon et al. (1996) sample, 
where a long-term disability plan is provided. The cost of such plans, 
whether by experience-rated premiums or by self-insurance, reflects the 
long-term safety experience of the workforce. Hence it is expected that 
where such programs are in place, management will be more attentive 
to workplace risks and will work harder to limit those risks. In other 
words, it will have an additional financial incentive to be involved with 
the safety culture of the firm.
Baril and Berthelette’s (2000) interviews on early return to work for 
a sample of Quebec workers’ compensation claims suggest that upper 
management support is important. When upper management support is 
lacking, safety committees are not able to exert any pressure on super-
visors to encourage them to comply with the firm’s health and safety 
rules. 
Although a management culture of safety involvement may be es-
tablished in places where there are perceived to be greater risk factors, 
the management culture in our research and in the research of Hunt et al. 
(1993) is assumed to have been determined by historical forces before 
the current period, and not by safety outcomes in the current period. 
We hope to minimize the possibility of reverse causality by including 
industry and occupational risk variables in the analysis when examin-
ing the impact of HRM programs. Following earlier research, we also 
treat the degree of employee participation and information sharing as 
exogenous in our analysis. 
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DOWNSIZING AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
There are no studies using firm-level data examining how downsiz-
ing affects workers’ compensation costs, though there have been several 
studies examining how individual claims are affected by employment 
status and how aggregate workers’ compensation costs are affected by 
aggregate unemployment rates. Fenn (1981), using a British sample of 
claimants, reports that claim durations increase with higher levels of 
unemployment. Butler and Worrall (1985), relying on a U.S. sample 
of claimants, find that claim durations also increase from the incidence 
of layoff or unemployment. Fortin and Lanoie (1992) find that high-
er levels of unemployment are associated with higher frequencies of 
workers’ compensation claims-filing as well, and it appears that work-
ers undergoing jobless spells are migrating from obtaining coverage 
under unemployment insurance to obtaining coverage under workers’ 
compensation insurance. Hartwig, Kahley, and Restrepo (1994) and 
Hartwig et al. (1997) find that the business cycle is a good predictor of 
workers’ compensation costs. In particular, as the unemployment rate 
increases, workers’ compensation claim frequency increases. Hence, 
layoffs and increased unemployment are likely to increase workers’ 
compensation costs. 
There are numerous reasons why downsizing might increase work-
ers’ compensation claims. Given the economic uncertainty associated 
with a reduction in the workforce, those who perceive that they may be 
laid off have some financial incentive to file a claim: while he is on a 
workers’ compensation claim, a worker may still be eligible for other 
fringe benefits such as medical care for the rest of his family. Moreover, 
workers’ compensation benefits replace two-thirds of a worker’s lost 
wages tax-free, while unemployment insurance only replaces one-half 
of the worker’s wages and may be taxed. In this situation, some of the 
increased costs may be the result of moral hazard (Butler and Worrall 
1991). 
There are reasons why even those who are not laid off may be af-
fected by the reduction in force. Downsizing frequently increases job 
stress (Mishra and Spreitzer 1998), and stress is known to affect work-
ers’ health and their tolerance for pain. Just as some professional golfers 
can play with a sore back or some ballplayers can play with bad legs 
when they want to, workers who enjoy their work or who are otherwise 
Butler&Park.indb   26 6/22/2005   11:51:38 AM
Prior Studies of Human Resource Management and Safety   27
well compensated for their work can work even if they are experiencing 
some level of discomfort. Once the rewarding, interesting work disap-
pears or the work becomes stressful, then pain becomes more noticeable 
(Fordyce 1996; Smith and Carayon 1996). None of the effects listed so 
far represent changes in the real level of risk associated with work, so 
these effects are generally considered types of claims-reporting moral 
hazard. However, there may be real effects if the downsizing alters 
the demographic characteristics of workers (such as resulting in more 
younger or contingent workers), or it substantially alters working hours 
(in that, say, full-time employees are now asked to work much longer 
hours than formerly) (Capelli et al. 1997; Park 1997; Butler, Park, and 
Zaidman 1998). If younger and contingent workers are laid off, then 
injury claim rates will decrease after a downsizing (while claim dura-
tion may go up or down, depending upon the resulting composition of 
claims). If employees work longer hours and thus are subject to more 
fatigue, then job risk may increase and result in more injuries. 
WHAT WE EXPECT TO FIND
This study goes beyond much of the earlier research and—following 
the approach of Hunt and Habeck (1993) and Hunt et al. (1993)—seeks 
to estimate the role of HRM practices in the determination of workers’ 
compensation costs in a multivariate framework. It uses a workplace 
safety model that incorporates a wider variety of HRM practices than 
has been previously employed. In particular, it analyzes the impact of 
the three important dimensions of HRM practices on safety: employee 
participation in decision making, employee participation in financial 
returns, and the firm’s management safety culture. In addition, this is 
the first study to consider the effect of each of these factors on claim 
frequency and claim severity, and to ask whether any observed change 
is the result of changes in technical efficiency or moral hazard (princi-
pal-agent) incentives. 
As workers and managers get more involved with firm safety (and 
as HRM practices increase within a firm), we generally expect that 
workers’ compensation costs will fall. Although participation in em-
ployee-owned firms yields inconclusive evidence, prior research on em-
ployee participation in decision making—aside from employee owner-
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ship—indicates that greater participation in decision making and more 
information sharing increases safety and lowers workers’ compensation 
costs. We expect to find the same results in our data, not only for injury 
claim rates but for injury severity as well. However, our expectation 
about the positive impact of HRM practices applies to claims frequency 
results and to the overall change in expected costs per worker, but not 
unambiguously to changes in claim duration. The ambiguous effect on 
claim duration arises because a change in claim frequency may dif-
ferentially alter the mix between long and short duration claims. The 
observed average duration may increase or decrease as a result.
The safety effect of employee participation in financial returns is 
theoretically ambiguous and—except for employee-owned firms—there 
is little prior research on participation in financial returns. The financial 
return estimates derived from employee ownership are fraught with 
problems of interpretation, as discussed above. We focus on variation 
in the degree of involvement in financial returns, aside from employee 
ownership. If firm profitability increases by taking more employment 
risks, then accidents and workers’ compensation costs could rise. We 
don’t expect, however, that that will happen; we expect that more finan-
cial participation by employees will lower workers’ compensation costs 
through either of the channels outlined in Chapter 1: technical efficien-
cy will increase as workers have an increased incentive to raise output, 
or moral hazard (principal-agent) outcomes will improve as workers 
have an increased incentive to lower costs.
Like employee participation in decision making, there is some evi-
dence that improved management safety culture lowers the injury claim 
rate, and that greater executive involvement in the firm’s safety pro-
cesses lowers the rate of injuries. We expect the same to be true in our 
sample. Though this has not been examined in the earlier literature, we 
expect that as the management safety culture improves (as our mea-
sures increase), the severity of injuries will fall as well.
THE DATA 
In July 1998, the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry sent 
out a safety survey to 230 state firms that had applied for a program 
called the Minnesota Safety Grant Program. The Safety Grant Program 
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awarded funds of up to $10,000 to qualifying employers for projects 
designed to reduce the risk of injury and illness to their workers through 
the purchase of new equipment and other physical improvements to 
enhance workplace safety. Other costs, including the cost of training, 
training materials, and labor costs generally, were not reimbursed under 
this program.
Qualifying employers under the Safety Grant Program must have 
been inspected by a qualified safety professional and have had a project 
consistent with the recommendations of the safety inspection. In es-
sence, projects funded were expected to reduce the risk of injury or dis-
ease. Employers under this grant were required to be committed to the 
implementation of the safety project, including showing a willingness 
to match the grant money awarded. This requirement of a commitment 
may explain the relatively high reported scores on the management 
safety culture index: either the sample firms were from management 
teams deeply committed to on-the-job safety (not implausible, given 
their interest in applying for the grant), or they merely reported on the 
survey that they were committed, since the same state agency that sup-
plied them with the grant money for their safety improvements also 
sponsored the safety survey. 
Preference under the Safety Grant Program was given to firms with 
a significant employment presence in their geographical area, and to 
firms where jobs were at risk because of safety shortcomings. This 
tended to favor small and medium-sized firms established in less urban 
areas of the state.
Some 121 firms completed the survey forms, for a sample response 
rate of 53 percent. The survey consists of 11 sections, covering the gen-
eral safety record of the company, company and employee characteris-
tics, management culture, human resource practices, safety practices, 
and safety consultation programs provided by the Minnesota Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (MNOSHA) consultation unit. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the question items included in the 22-page survey. 
These 121 firms have matched with about 5,125 workers’ compensation 
indemnity claims for the years 1990 through 1998—that is, the claims 
were filed by workers of those 121 firms. Federal employer identifica-
tion numbers were only available for about 10 percent of the sample and 
have proven to be unreliable for matching. Hence, we used the name of 




Section                Section title                                                          Content
Section I Workplace Safety Statistical Data Safety records and other general information of the respondent firm
•   SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) codes 
•   OSHA 200 log information for the past five years
•   workers’ compensation premium and covered payroll for the past five years 
•   OSHA compliance, number of work sites
Section II Company and Employee 
Characteristics
Information on employee characteristics and general employer characteristics
• number of nonmanagerial workers 
• recent layoffs or cutbacks in employees
• number of shifts operated and frequency of employee shift changes
• workforce demography (age, education, tenure, gender, race), occupational mix
 
Section III Management Culture and HRM 
Practices
Top management’s commitment in safety and health policy and employee 
participation practices
• management culture (management’s strategic involvement in safety practices)
• employee participation in safety practices (safety committees, union 
negotiations, ergonomics, performance review, certification requirements, 
return-to-work program, etc.)
• employee involvement in firm decision making (quality circles, work teams, 
Total Quality Management, representation on the board of directors, etc.)
• employee involvement in financial incentive programs (profit sharing, gain 
sharing, employee stock ownership plan, group bonus plan, 401(k), etc.)
Table 2.1  Contents of Minnesota Workplace Safety Practices (MWSP) Survey
Section IV Safety Practices Respondent firm’s current safety practices and policies
Section V Experience with Workplace Safety 
and Health Consultation Service
Respondent firm’s experience with Safety and Health Consultation Service, 
including OSHA workplace consultation services
Section VI Safety Committees Respondent firm’s experience with Labor-Management Safety Committee
Section VII Minnesota Safety Grant Program Respondent firm’s experience with Minnesota Safety Grant Program
Section VIII Minnesota Log Safe Program Respondent firm’s experience with Minnesota Log Safe Program
Section IX Minnesota Workplace Violence 
Program
Respondent firm’s experience with Minnesota Workplace Violence Program
Section X Minnesota Safety and Health 
Achievement Recognition  
Program (MNSHARP)
Respondent firm’s experience with Minnesota Safety and Health Achievement 
Recognition Program (MNSHARP)
Section XI General Respondent Information Marketing information about OSHA consultation programs
NOTE: In Section V, only general features of consultation services are covered. Individual-specific OSHA consultation programs are 
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the firm in matching the two databases (i.e., matching the survey data 
with the workers’ compensation administrative claims data).
The matching process involves three steps. First, we wrote an SAS 
program that screened the possible matches by searching over relevant 
character strings. If the firm were named “Park Inc.,” for example, the 
SAS program would filter out all similar possible names, including 
“Parks Incorporated,” “SPARK INC.,” “PARK Inc.,” “BALLPARK 
Inc.,” etc. Second, a researcher at the Minnesota Department of Labor 
and Industry familiar with the Minnesota workers’ compensation data-
base checked each potential match. Third, we verified the matches by 
using the company’s zip code from the addresses given in both data 
sets. 
Following this procedure, we merge firm-level data from the survey 
to claimant-level data from Minnesota’s workers’ compensation files at 
the Department of Labor and Industry. Since costs are the product of 
claim frequency, claim duration, and benefits, we partition our statisti-
cal analysis into claim frequency and claim duration components to see 
whether the HRM practices affect claim frequency, claim duration, or 
both. This will provide evidence about whether costs are reduced either 
because of loss prevention effects (in that a particular practice reduces 
the number of claims) or loss control effects (in that a particular prac-
tice limits the costs of those injuries that have occurred). We assume 
that the benefit parameters (maximum and minimum benefits) are ex-
ogenous relative to the choices made by the firms in our survey and do 
not model benefit determination here. 
As a result of our desire to partition HRM effects into their claim 
frequency and claim duration components, our descriptive sample sta-
tistics vary by type of analysis. These descriptive statistics are given in 
the empirical work in the next two chapters of the monograph, next to 
the corresponding analysis relevant to the descriptive statistics.
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Notes
 1. For notable exceptions, see Hunt et al. (1993), Park (1997), and Rooney (1992).
 2.  Park (1997) offers one possible explanation: “The firms with relatively more 
hazardous working conditions may implement various types of safety-enhanc-
ing efforts, including the practice of employee involvement plans in workplace 
safety issues” (p. 81)—in other words, reverse causality. 
 3.  Likert scales were developed in 1932 by Rensis Likert, an organizational psy-
chologist, as the familiar five-point bipolar response format that asks people to 
gauge their responses by how much they support or don’t support (something), 
how much they are willing or not willing, etc., based on at least a five-response 
scale—often a seven-response scale is employed. At one end of the scale would 
be something like “Strongly support”; at the other end, “Strongly oppose.” These 
scales are widely used in education, psychology, and sociology.
 4. For more on the Active Safety Leadership factor, see also Habeck, Hunt, and 
VanTol (1998), Habeck et al. (1998), and Hunt et al. (1993).
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Earlier Safety and HRM Practices 
Employee Participation, Management
Safety Culture, and Corporate Downsizing
CORPORATE DOWNSIZING AND HRM PRACTICES: 
THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
 
To gauge the influence of human resource management (HRM) 
practice on corporate safety, we estimate the direct and indirect effects 
of HRM practice on the firm’s lost workday costs due to injury. In par-
ticular, we examine how lost workday costs vary along different HRM 
dimensions, as discussed in the last chapter. These dimensions are 1) 
the extent and intensity of employees’ decision-making involvement 
and the level of employees’ financial involvement in the company’s per-
formance, and 2) indices of management’s commitment to workplace 
safety and the extent of management’s information sharing. We calcu-
late the estimated strength of these effects by their coefficients in claim 
frequency and claim duration regressions, then we relate the effects to 
their implied safety benefits.
The indirect effects of these programs may also be important. An-
ecdotal evidence suggests that injury claims tend to increase with an-
nounced reductions in workforce or as local unemployment rates rise. 
We estimate how layoffs affect claim duration by including a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm has experienced any recent employ-
ment layoffs or cutbacks. In our models, we were also interested to see 
whether any of the corporate safety culture variables listed in the previ-
ous paragraph modify the layoff/claim-duration effect: that is, whether 
there are interactions between HRM practices and downsizing.
Competitive pressures to restructure the workplace by adopting new 
technologies, new management practices, new work tasks or processes, 
and new models of work organization give greater impetus to finding 
HRM practices that improve firms’ performance (Appelbaum and Batt 
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1994; Cappelli et al. 1997; Levine and Tyson 1990). The search for 
improved performance not only has changed work processes for many 
employees, it also has led to changes in the size of the workforce itself. 
Corporations seek to become more cost-competitive by reducing their 
number of employees. Corporations also seek to become efficient by 
changing their corporate safety culture. For example, they may change 
the level of employee involvement or the types of safety programs they 
employ.
CLAIM FREQUENCY RESULTS
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 indicate a relatively high lost-
work-time injury rate (.06) and a substantial amount of downsizing 
(32.6 percent had experienced downsizing of their workforce in the 12 
months preceding the sample survey date), reflecting the dynamics of 
the midsize and small firms in the sample. Twenty-five companies are 
represented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in our analysis of claim frequency; 
some of these companies provide two or three years’ worth of data. The 
relatively small sample size occurs because the “percentage of produc-
tion workers” variable is missing in many of the surveys. We include 
percentage of production workers (and deal with the smaller sample 
size) in the analysis, however, because it is the best proxy we have 
for occupational differences (hence, intrinsic workplace risk) between 
firms, a factor we think is important to control for in our analysis, for 
reasons mentioned previously.
The values of the HRM variables indicate a relatively high rate of 
employee and management involvement in the safety efforts of the firm. 
The Management Safety Culture variable (MGTCULT) in Table 3.1 pro-
vides an index of management’s relative involvement in the company’s 
safety programs; the mean score of 23.01 indicates a relatively high 
level of management involvement in safety among these firms. Infor-
mation Sharing (INFOSHR), another index, is created from six variables 
indicating the extent of information sharing with employees in several 
dimensions of firm activity: investments, production, human resource 
planning, profitability, corporate finance, and workplace safety. A score 
of 5 in each of these six dimensions indicates complete sharing; a score 
of 1 indicates no information sharing. The highest possible level of in-
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formation sharing, then, would receive a score of 30; the lowest, a score 
of 5. The mean score of about 19 indicates that management shares a 
significant amount of information but not all of it.
 Employee Participation in Decision Making (EPDM) is the sum of 
eight dummy variables indicating whether the firm allows employee 
participation in the following decision-making activities: suggestion 
system, quality circles, self-managing work teams, joint labor-manage-
ment committees, quality of work life program, total quality manage-
ment program, job redesign, and employee representation on the board 
of directors. The mean score of 2.63 indicates that the average firm in 
this part of the analysis uses less than three of these eight HR decision-
making practices. Employee Participation in Decision Making (EPDM) 
indicates the breadth of decision-making activities that workers partici-
pate in, and Intensity of Employee Participation (EPDEG) indicates the 
depth. The mean score of 8.01 indicates that workers are reported to 
participate rather intensely in those decision-making activities they are 
involved with. So while workers are not involved in many strategic de-
cision-making activities, they participate intensely in the few in which 
they are involved.
 Similar to Employee Participation in Decision Making, Employee 
Participation in Financial Returns (EPFR) is the sum of 10 dummy vari-
ables indicating whether the firm allows employees to participate in 
the following: individual incentive plan, cash profit-sharing plan, gain 
sharing, pension plan, stock purchase plan, employee stock ownership 
plan, deferred profit-sharing plan, skill-based pay, 401(k) plan, and 
group bonus plan. The mean score of 2.125 indicates that, on average, 
the firms in the frequency analysis offer only two of these 10 options to 
participate in the financial returns of the firm.
Given the results cited in the literature above, our expectations are 
that higher values of these HRM variables will generally lower claim 
frequency. Which HRM practices actually do lower claim frequency, 
and by how much, is an empirical issue addressed in Table 3.2. 
Since the results in the left-hand column of Table 3.2 come from a 
linear probability model, they are readily interpreted as the change in 
the probability of an injury given a unit change in the corresponding re-
gressors. (Since the specifications in the center and right-hand columns 
involve injury severity measures rather than injury frequency, they will 
be discussed below.) For example, unionized workplaces have a 4 per-




Variable Definition Mean Std. dev.
Dependent variables
INJINC (Injury incidence rate) Number of workers’ compensation claims per employee 0.060 0.256
INJSEV1 (Injury severity rate 1) Number of lost workdays per employee 0.784 1.992
INJSEV2 (Injury severity rate 2) Number of lost workdays per injury 18.616 31.425
Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE A dummy variable coded 1 if the claimant’s company experi-
enced layoffs or cutbacks in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
0.326 0.470
HRM variables
EPDM Number of employee participation programs in decision-
making process
2.631 1.473
EPFR Number of employee participation programs in the firm’s 
financial returns
2.125 1.211
MGTCULT Score of management’s commitment to workplace safety 23.011 2.896
EPDEG Score of the degree of employee participation in the 
company’s decision-making process
8.011 1.256
INFOSHR Score of the degree to which management shares information 
with employees on production issues
18.895 5.079
Table 3.1  Descriptive Statistics: Firm-Level Analysis (1996–1998 Claims)
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Control variables
UNION A dummy variable coded 1 if the workplace is unionized, 
0 otherwise
0.745 0.437
PCTWOMEN Percentage of women employees 47.654 34.647
PCTAGE (25–54) Percentage of employees aged 25–54 68.307 15.800
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Table 3.2  The Effects of Human Resource Management Policies on Workplace Injuries 
 (Firm-Level Analysis: Full Model Adjusted for Asymptotic Covariances)
Variable
Dependent variable: Number 
of workers’ compensation 
claims per employee
Dependent variable: 
Average  lost 
workdays per employee
Dependent variable: 
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Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
F value     2.608*** 1.007 0.769
n 78 78 54
NOTE: Estimated heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** 
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centage point lower frequency of injuries than nonunion workplaces. 
A 10 percentage point increase in the number of production employees 
results in a 0.9 percentage point increase in the injury rate. An increase 
in the injury rate accompanying the addition of more production em-
ployees is expected, as production employees engage in riskier work 
activities than managerial workers. The union effect is more difficult 
to interpret: unions tend to enforce safety standards at work more than 
nonunion workplaces, which would explain why unions might decrease 
the injury rate. However, unions tend to form at worksites that are in-
trinsically more dangerous, so on the basis of sample selection one 
might expect a positive coefficient here.
The strongest effect among the control variables, however, is that 
of female workers. Nearly half of the workers in our frequency are fe-
male employees (47.65 percent). Our results suggest that increasing the 
number of females by 10 percentage points (to 57.65 percent) would 
decrease the injury rate by 2 percentage points. An increase of one full 
standard deviation in the percentage of female workers (that is, an in-
crease of 34.6 percentage points) would decrease the injury rate by 7 
percentage points.
The negative coefficient on the Downsizing dummy variable (DOWN-
SIZE) suggests that sample selection and moral hazard mitigate the fil-
ing of additional claims. For those already on a lost-time claim, the 
effect of downsizing is to increase claim duration (as indicated by the 
3.75 coefficient in the right-hand column of Table 3.2 for aggregated 
firm results and the positive Downsizing coefficients in Table 3.4 for 
individual claimant data). However, while claim duration increases for 
extant claims, claim frequency falls in those firms experiencing layoffs: 
either downsizing selectivity retains those workers least likely to file a 
claim (sample selection), or workers won’t file claims for fear of being 
included in the next round of layoffs (i.e., there is a moral hazard that 
lowers the firm’s safety costs). However, the downsizing effect is rela-
tively small: downsized firms have only a 3.2 percentage point lower 
rate of injury than firms that have not downsized, though the difference 
appears to be significant at the 5 percent level.
Because HRM variables are our central focus in the analysis, we dis-
cuss those results from two different perspectives. The first is the stan-
dard regression interpretation of the estimated coefficients, reflecting 
the percentage change in injury rates given a unit increase in the value 
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of the respective HRM practice. For example, a one-unit increase in In-
formation Sharing increases claims by 0.5 percentage points, as shown 
in Table 3.2 in the left-hand column. However, because HRM variables 
are constructed as sums of dummy variables, one cannot always intuit 
what a unit increase means in terms of HRM practice. Therefore we 
also report the effects of the HRM variables from a high-HRM-use per-
spective, looking at the change from the usual values for HRM to the 
values of the respective HRM variables employed by the top 16 percent 
of firms (thus only about one-sixth of the firms have this level of HRM 
practice). This high HRM use is the level of HRM practice that lies one 
standard deviation above the mean. Hence, the claim frequency is 2.5 
percentage points higher at the high-HRM-use level than at the average 
level, because a standard deviation increase in the value of information 
sharing from 20 to 25 percentage points increases claim frequency by 
2.5 percentage points (5 × 0.005).
The human resource management practice variables in the left-hand 
column of Table 3.2 generally have the expected signs, including sta-
tistically significant impacts on the claim rate. The intensity of worker 
involvement (EPDEG) does not affect claim frequency (the − 0.002 coef-
ficient is statistically insignificant).1 More information sharing seems 
to increase the injury rate, as discussed in the last paragraph. Adding 
another program to involve employees in the firm’s decision making 
(increasing EPDM by one unit) lowers the injury rate by 1.2 percent-
age points. Increasing the ways that employees share in the company’s 
financial returns (EPFR) by one more program lowers the injury rate by 
1.4 percentage points, and adding one more dimension to management 
safety culture (MGTCULT) also lowers the injury rate by 1.2 percentage 
points. 
While Employee Participation in Decision Making, Employee Par-
ticipation in Financial Returns, and Management Safety Culture all have 
roughly the same estimated coefficient, Management Safety Culture’s 
influence is nearly twice as great when measured on a high-HRM-use 
perspective because variation in management safety culture is so much 
greater than variation in employee participation: in Table 3.1, the Man-
agement Safety Culture standard deviation is nearly twice as great as 
that of the employee participation variable EPDM and more than twice as 
great as that of EPFR. Hence, while the move to a high-HRM-use level 
would lower the injury rate by 1.7 percentage points for either of the 
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employee participation variables, the move to a high-HRM-use level 
for Management Safety Culture would lower the injury claim rate by 
3.5 percentage points. Finally, the move to a high-HRM-use level in 
the intensity of employee involvement in decision making (EPDEG) de-
creases the injury claims rate by 0.3 percentage points.
With the exception of Hunt et al. (1993), there are no studies of 
the impact of HR practices on claim frequency. Hunt et al. (1993) ana-
lyze survey results for 220 medium and large firms in Michigan and 
link their safety practices to their claim filing rates and measures of 
claim severity. Their safety diligence, safety training, proactive return-
to-work program, and active safety leadership factors (which overlap 
our Management Safety Culture variable) are negatively correlated 
with their lost-workday case rate and with the workers’ compensation 
claim rate in multivariate regressions and are generally statistically sig-
nificant. Their sample sizes vary between 187 and 161, depending on 
specification. In the workers’ compensation specification, Hunt et al. 
(1993) find that firm-size dummy variables are not usually statistically 
significant but that industry dummy variables are. They also report a 
regression, with aggregate, average lost workdays per case as the de-
pendent variable, in which they find no statistically significant effects 
of safety practices on claim severity. 
In the next section we examine the duration of individual claims for 
a larger number of claims than Hunt et al. (1993) had available, using 
individual claimant data from the Minnesota Department of Labor and 
Industry.
CLAIM DURATION RESULTS
Aggregate data: Table 3.2 revisited. While the most credible 
information on claim duration comes from the analysis of individual 
claim durations in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the middle and right columns in 
Table 3.2 provide some alternative estimates on how HRM policies af-
fect claim duration. The middle column of Table 3.2 corresponds most 
closely to the expected cost analysis given in Table 3.6, below, but is not 
always consistent with those results: increases in Employee Participa-
tion in Decision Making, Employee Participation in Financial Returns, 
and Management Safety Culture reduce expected losses, as they do in 
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Table 3.6, but the Management Safety Culture effect is relatively small 
and statistically insignificant, unlike the Management Safety Culture 
effect of Table 3.6. Moreover, increases in Intensity of Employee Par-
ticipation or in Information Sharing lower expected costs in Table 3.2’s 
middle column but have a positive effect in Table 3.6.
A specification that is most like the duration specification of this 
section is the right column of Table 3.2: they both model the duration 
of injuries, though the empirical results differ somewhat. Increases in 
Employee Participation in Financial Returns and in Information Shar-
ing are found to be linked to lower claim durations in Table 3.2, as they 
are in the results reported in Table 3.4 below. Intensity of Employee 
Participation has the same positive impact on duration in Table 3.2 as it 
does in Table 3.4. However, Management Safety Culture and Employee 
Participation in Decision Making have the opposite signs, though the 
Employee Participation in Decision Making variable is statistically in-
significant in both specifications. 
The estimated effect of Management Safety Culture on claim du-
ration is 10 times larger in Table 3.4 than it is in Table 3.2, perhaps 
because those tables represent a slightly different sample of firms, or 
perhaps because the measure of claim duration is slightly different. 
The sample in Table 3.2, as previously noted in the discussion of the 
descriptive statistics, is limited to those reporting a full set of control 
variables (union or nonunion, percentage women, percentage young, 
percentage production employees). Thus there is a smaller sample of 
firms contributing to the estimates in Table 3.2 than in Table 3.4. How-
ever, we doubt, given the approximate similarity in their sample means, 
that this explains the differential response.
A more likely explanation of the difference in results is that claim 
duration is measured differently. The firm-specific OSHA data (report-
ed to the U.S. Department of Labor) in the far right-hand column of 
Table 3.2 include workers whose injury duration is shorter than three 
days, whereas the data in Table 3.4 exclude those who don’t satisfy 
the three-day waiting period. In workers’ compensation, claims with a 
duration of less than the waiting period are called medical-only claims. 
Appel and Borba (1988) report that the medical-only category accounts 
for 81 percent of all claims, although it accounts for less than 6 percent 
of total costs. If Management Safety Culture successfully reduced long-
duration claims while encouraging the reporting of short-term injury in-
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cidents (which included medical-only workers’ compensation claims), 
then this would explain both results: few long-duration claims occur as 
Management Safety Culture increases (Table 3.4), but more diligent re-
porting and monitoring of minor injuries does occur (Table 3.2). Unfor-
tunately, the Minnesota data do not record information on medical-only 
claims, so pursuit of this hypothesis (claims shifting as Management 
Safety Culture changes) will have to wait for future research.
Individual claim data: Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The descriptive statis-
tics for the duration analysis given in Table 3.3 indicate that the mean 
duration of workers’ compensation claims among claimants with some 
lost-time workdays is 55.78 days.2 However, 20 percent of these are 
right-censored (and were still in progress when we drew our sample 
of claims), hence the 55.78 days is an underestimate of the average 
completed spell of workers’ compensation. Some claims, often those 
of longer duration, will still be in progress when information about the 
claims is gathered. If a claim has been in progress for two weeks, for ex-
ample, when the sample of claims is drawn, we cannot be sure whether 
the final duration of the in-progress claim will be 15 days, 15 weeks, or 
even 15 months. We only know that the duration is at least two weeks 
long. If the duration of this in-progress spell is recorded as “2 weeks,” 
we underestimate the final duration and bias the results. If the in-prog-
ress spells are thrown out, we tend to bias the estimates again, as these 
claims will tend to be of longer duration. Maximum likelihood estima-
tion allows us to include these in-progress spells while accounting for 
the right-censoring in a way that doesn’t lead to biased estimates. The 
maximum likelihood estimates, employing a Weibull duration model 
(McDonald and Butler 1990), are reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
The values of the variables for employee participation and manage-
ment culture in Table 3.3 indicate a relatively high rate of employee 
and management involvement in the safety efforts of the firm and are 
very similar to those reported in Table 3.1. The differences between 
the statistics in Table 3.1 and those in Table 3.3 stem from the weights 
given to different firms: in Table 3.1, each firm receives equal weight in 
determining the mean; in Table 3.3, the larger firms have more claims 
and so implicitly get greater weight than they do in Table 3.1. The main 
difference in the Employee Participation in Decision Making, Employ-
ee Participation in Financial Returns, and Information Sharing variable 
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averages—all of which are more representative of the larger firms—is 
that HRM variables in the claim duration specification have slightly 
higher values in Table 3.3 than these same variables have in the claim 
frequency sample in Table 3.1. Given the results cited in the literature 
above, our expectations are that higher values of these HRM culture 
variables will lower claim duration. Which ones, and by how much, is 
an empirical issue addressed in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, where we employ 
maximum likelihood to estimate the duration of workers’ compensation 
claims. 
We generally find statistically significant effects, of the expected 
sign, in the duration models. While we do not report the estimated shape 
parameters of the Weibull distribution in Tables 3.4 or 3.5, they indicate 
negative duration dependence: as claim duration increases, the rate of 
exit from claimant status falls. Hence, the longer a claimant stays on a 
workers’ compensation claim, the less likely he is to leave it. 
The demographic variables in the Weibull regressions of Tables 3.4 
and 3.5 have their expected effect. For example, a 10 percent increase 
in the age of a claimant increases the expected claim duration by 7 
percent when there are no controls for industry, occupation, and injury, 
and it increases the expected claim duration by 4 percent when such 
controls are present (see the right-hand column coefficient for age).3 
This is the same sign, but twice the magnitude, of the age elasticity 
reported by Butler and Worrall (1985). The replacement rate elasticity 
is also higher here than that reported in Butler and Worrall (1985) but is 
within the range generally found in empirical research (Butler, Gardner, 
and Gardner 1997). In our Minnesota sample, a 10 percent increase in 
benefits (holding wages constant) increases the expected claim duration 
by about 5 percent (the right-hand column in Table 3.4). We find no 
gender differences in duration, nor do we find a self-insurance effect 
once industry and occupation are held constant.
The empirical findings in Table 3.4 also show Downsizing and HRM 
effects of the expected sign. If the firm has downsized its workforce in 
the last 12 months, then claim duration is 20 percent higher than it would 
be without any recent downsizing. These results are consistent with ear-
lier findings that workers’ compensation costs increase in environments 
where there is greater employment uncertainty. This finding is impor-
tant since it is the first time that firm-specific downsizing information 
(as opposed to individual employment status or local unemployment in-




Table 3.3  Duration Model Using Claimant Data: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev.
Dependent variables
NWSPELL Duration of nonwork spell: days of temporary total disability benefits paid 
in workers’ compensation systema
55.78 140.91




DOWNSIZE A dummy variable coded 1 if the claimant’s company experienced layoffs 
or cutbacks in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
0.40 0.49
HRM variables
EPDM Number of employee participation programs in decision-making process 3.12 1.36
EPFR Number of employee participation programs in the firm’s financial returns 3.08 2.16
MGTCULT Score of management’s commitment to workplace safety 22.62 2.29
EPDEG Score of the degree of employee participation in company’s decision-making 
process
8.12 1.00
INFOSHR Score of the degree to which management shares information with 
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Claimant characteristics
MALE A dummy variable coded 1 if claimant is male, 0 if female 0.53 0.50








SELF A dummy variable coded 1 if claimant’s company is self-insured for its 
workers’ compensation coverage
0.29 0.45
a The dependent variable NWSPELL is transformed into logarithmic form in the LIFEREG function of SAS. 
b Descriptive statistics of variables without taking logs.
c Real-wage replacement rate was used to capture both wage and expected workers’ compensation benefit effects on the dependent 
variable. In accordance with the Minnesota workers’ compensation law, RATE was calculated by the following formula (Minnesota WC 
income benefit schedule used; 1992 analysis of workers’ compensation laws, U.S. Chamber of Commerce):
 RATE = MAXt / Wage if (Wage × 0.66) ≥ MAXt
  0.66 if [MINt ≤ (Wage × 0.66) < MAXt]
  MINt / Wage if [(MINt × 0.66) ≤ (Wage × 0.66) < MINt]
  1 otherwise,
 where Wage is average production employee’s gross weekly wage, MAXt is maximum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota 
workers’ compensation system, and MINt is minimum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota workers’ compensation system. 
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Table 3.4  Weibull Estimates of the Duration of Nonwork Spells in the 
Workers’ Compensation System: The Direct Effects Model 
(standard error in parentheses)
Variable
Dependent variable: log of nonwork spell in
Minnesota workers’ compensation system

















































Industry dummies no yes
Injury type dummies no yes
Occupation dummies no yes
Year dummies no yes
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NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Model (1) Model (2)
Log likelihood for Weibull −3057.40 −2655.01
n 1906 1732
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Table 3.5  Weibull Estimates of the Duration of Nonwork Spells in the 
Workers’ Compensation System: The Indirect Effects Model 
(standard error in parentheses)
Variable
Dependent variable: log of nonwork 
spell in the Minnesota workers’ 
compensation system































HRM × Downsizing interactions
























Butler&Park.indb   52 6/22/2005   11:51:43 AM
Earlier Safety and HRM Practices   53
Variable
Dependent variable: log of nonwork 
spell in the Minnesota workers’ 
compensation system



















Industry dummies no yes
Injury type dummies no yes
Occupation dummies no yes
Year dummies no yes
Log likelihood for Weibull −3,054.20 −2,646.97
n 1,906 1,732
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 3.5 (continued)
Butler&Park.indb   53 6/22/2005   11:51:43 AM
54  Butler and Park
surance rates) has been used in an analysis of individual claim duration. 
The Downsizing effect is not only large in magnitude but statistically 
significant as well. Our results suggest that the tendency for workers’ 
compensation costs to increase during downsizing operates through a 
claim duration effect rather than through a claims filing effect. 
All of the HRM variables except Employee Participation in Deci-
sion Making (EPDM) also significantly reduce claim duration, and they 
generally have larger estimated effects on claim duration than they do 
on claim frequency. Even though the number of decision-making activ-
ities does not affect claim duration, the intensity of participation does. A 
standard deviation increase in the intensity of employees’ involvement, 
creating a jump to the high-HRM-use level, increases claim duration by 
20 percent. (Recall that Intensity of Employee Participation is the sum 
of two Likert scores indicating to what degree workers feel as though 
they “always” have control over their job tasks and whether they “al-
ways” participate in employee involvement programs.) The greater the 
level of intensity of employee involvement, the higher the safety costs. 
Our guess is that as workers become more involved in making and dis-
seminating company safety policy, they are able to reduce the number 
of shorter, less serious injury claims more than they reduce the number 
of longer claims. This changes the mix of claims observed, increasing 
the observed duration of the remaining claims. If this were the only fac-
tor operating, however, the frequency effects would outweigh the dura-
tion effects, and overall costs per employee would fall as information 
sharing increased. We shall see that this is not the case. Other factors 
must be involved—future research will likely shed more light on this 
interesting result. One possibility is that as more information is shared 
in the company, workers are more willing to provide information on 
their workplace injuries, including minor injuries not involving signifi-
cant loss of work time claims. Another possibility, which we find less 
plausible, is endogeneity bias: firms are more willing to share informa-
tion in situations where risk is greatest.
We again report the effects of the HRM variables from the high-
HRM-use perspective, looking at the change from the average HRM 
practice to the top 16 percent of high-HRM-use firms. From this per-
spective, if the number of financial returns programs (such as profit 
sharing) increases by a standard deviation by going from three such 
programs (the average) to five (the high-use level in our sample), then 
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claim duration falls by 26 percent. High-use implementation in Infor-
mation Sharing, which for our sample means going from an index score 
of 20 to 25, decreases claim duration by 30 percent. The greater the 
workers’ financial interest in their firm, the lower their claim durations 
will be, on average. This reinforces the reducing effect that participa-
tion in financial returns has on claim frequency.
Finally, it appears that those managers most involved in their com-
pany’s safety efforts achieve the greatest decline in the duration of their 
employees’ claims. When an average firm employs high-use HRM prac-
tices—equivalent to a standard deviation increase in the Management 
Safety Culture index, from about 23 to 25—claim duration decreases 
by 30 percent. This is a large effect, and it reinforces the management 
safety effect on claim frequency. This is also consistent with the find-
ings of Hunt et al. (1993). 
These large magnitudes indicate a substantial direct impact of HRM 
practices on claim duration. Since the research cited above, as well as 
anecdotal evidence from the insurance industry, indicates that down-
sizing and employment cycles have a significant impact on claims fil-
ing, we also examine, in Table 3.5, whether there are indirect effects of 
HRM practices that operate through a reduction in the Downsizing vari-
able. We measure this indirect effect by adding interactions between 
downsizing and HRM practices to the analysis.
In general, there is little evidence of such indirect effects. In Table 
3.5, only the financial returns interaction in the right-hand column is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level; all of the other interactions 
are insignificant at the 5 percent level. Taken as a group, the interactions 
in the left-hand column of Table 3.5 are statistically insignificant when 
using a likelihood ratio test, and the ones in the right-hand column are 
significant at the 5 percent level but not at the 1 percent level. 
Hence, with the single exception of the Financial Returns × Down-
sizing interaction, the effects of HRM practices on claim duration are 
direct effects and do not seem to ameliorate the impact of downsizing 
on costs. The estimated negative effect of Financial Returns × Down-
sizing on claim duration indicates that when employees participate in 
the financial success of a company, they tend to file claims of shorter 
duration in the face of downsizing efforts, as would be expected. How-
ever, better HRM practices in other dimensions (Information Sharing, 
Management Safety Culture, and Employee Participation in Decision 
Butler&Park.indb   55 6/22/2005   11:51:44 AM
56  Butler and Park
Making) do not seem to mitigate the effect that Downsizing has on an 
increase in claim duration. It may well be that those who perceive that 
they are going to be downsized are no longer concerned about their par-
ticipation in HRM practices, or about gaining information about those 
practices, because they see them as largely irrelevant. If they are no 
longer employed in that firm, firm outcome matters less to them.
COST IMPLICATIONS OF THE FREQUENCY AND 
DURATION ESTIMATES
Since expected indemnity costs per worker are simply the product 
of claim frequency, of claim duration (in weeks), and of the legislated 
benefits, we can examine whether safety programs operate through a 
loss prevention (frequency) effect or a loss reduction (duration) effect. 
Our results are summarized in Table 3.6. In our sample, the average 
indemnity cost (the amount paid to injured employees for lost wages) 
per injury was $175.50.4 This average annual indemnity cost per em-
ployee can be calculated by taking the product of the number of claims 
per employee times the average duration (in weeks) per claim times the 
average statutory weekly benefit. To calculate the impact of a particular 
HRM practice variable (say, the effect of Employee Participation in 
Financial Returns, or EPFR) on annual indemnity cost per employee, we 
take the derivative of costs (in natural logarithm terms) with respect to 
that variable:
(3.1) ∂ln(Cost) = ∂ln(Frequency) + ∂ln(Duration) + ∂ln(Benefit)   ∂ EPFR              ∂ EPFR                  ∂ EPFR               ∂ EPFR
             
On the right-hand side of the above equation, the first term repre-
sents the percentage change in injury frequency relative to a unit change 
in the Employee Participation in Financial Returns index; it equals the 
estimated linear probability coefficient in Table 3.2 divided by the aver-
age probability of a claim. This is given in the left-hand column of Table 
3.6. The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (3.1) represents 
the percentage change in injury duration relative to a unit change in the 
Employee Participation in Financial Returns index. It equals the esti-
mated regression coefficient from the survival analysis for the duration 
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model results given in Table 3.4. These coefficients are reproduced in 
the second column in Table 3.6. The third term on the right-hand side of 
Equation (3.1) captures the influence of a firm’s Employee Participation 
in Financial Returns index on statewide statutory benefits. This effect 
is probably close to zero since there is no reason a change in employee 
involvement in the firm’s financial returns—or any other HRM prac-
tice—should change the legislated benefit level.5
The overall change in indemnity costs can be approximated by mul-
tiplying the percentage change in the indemnity costs shown in the two 
left-hand columns of Table 3.6 (and summed in the third column) by 
the average indemnity cost in this sample, $175.50. This calculation 
is made in the far right-hand column of Table 3.6, both for a one-unit 
change in each of the HRM indices and also (in parentheses) for a one-
standard-deviation change in HRM indices, indicating a movement to 
the high-HRM-use practice level.
As an example, if a firm were to go from using two to using three fi-
nancial returns programs (Employee Participation in Financial Returns 
went from 2 to 3), then claim frequency would fall by 23 percent and 
claim duration would fall by 13 percent. Lost work-time benefit costs 
Table 3.6  Safety Cost Implications of Lost-Time Pay in Workers’ 















(per std. dev. 
change)
EPDM −20 6 −14 −24.57 (−36.19)
EPFR −23 −13 −36 −63.18 (−76.51)
MGTCULT −20 −15 −35 −61.43 (−177.89)
EPDEG −3 19 16 28.08 (35.27)
INFOSHR 8 −6 2 3.51 (17.83)
NOTE: Based on 1996 average lost-time workers’ compensation costs per employee 
of $175.50 in our sample (12 percent of claims were still open).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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would fall by 36 percent (the combined impact of frequency and dura-
tion outcomes), which when multiplied by the average indemnity cost 
per employee of $175.50 yields a cost reduction in lost-time expenses 
of $63.18 per employee per year. This is the approximate reduction in 
per-employee costs that is achieved by adding another plan in which the 
employee shares in the financial returns of the company. If the employ-
er were to add 1.211 more programs (that is, add one standard deviation 
more to Employee Participation in Financial Returns programs—Table 
3.1) to the firm’s current offerings, then costs would fall by 1.211 × 
$63.18, or by $76.51. A standard deviation increase is equivalent to 
moving from the average HRM offering (an HRM offering as good as 
about half of the firms) to an HRM offering that is in the top 16 percent 
of the firms.
Management Safety Culture is the HRM practice with the largest 
cost savings per employee. A firm that increases its level of involve-
ment so that the Management Safety Culture variable goes up by 3—or 
increases by more than 10 percent and comes up into the high-HRM-
use level—saves about $180 per year per employee. In a firm with 100 
employees, this is an annual savings of $18,000 in lost-time pay alone. 
This is likely a lower bound on the benefits derived from improving 
management safety culture. Medical costs will be saved in addition to 
the lost-time pay costs; lost workdays will be eliminated and specific 
human capital thereby retained; and employees’ level of job satisfac-
tion may increase as well. There is a lot of variation in the value of this 
variable in our sample, as one can see by looking at the large standard 
deviation values in Tables 3.1 and 3.3. As there is a lot of variance in 
Management Safety Culture, there is a lot of opportunity for firms to 
lower safety costs by becoming more involved with work safety.6 If, in 
a 100-employee firm, it costs less than $18,000 to become more con-
cerned with safety processes and outcomes, then it is clearly advanta-
geous for the firm to do so.
It is worthwhile to reemphasize that our estimate of the reduction 
in workers’ compensation costs from engaging in these HRM practic-
es is probably a lower bound estimate of the potential benefits. To the 
extent that the workplace is safer, either because physical risks have 
been reduced or because workers are taking more appropriate safety 
precautions, then some other accident costs are likely to be reduced as 
well. Uncompensated wage loss and pain and suffering associated with 
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injuries will decrease, reducing the compensating wages paid to work-
ers. Perhaps equally important in our highly skilled labor market, more 
firm-specific human capital can be retained as the number of days out 
due to injury falls. 
Notes
 1.  EPDEG does appear to be associated with greater claim severity (the significant 
EPDEG coefficients in the center and right columns). An increase in EPDEG also is 
estimated to increase claim duration in the individual claimant analysis in Table 
3.4, as we will show shortly.
   The models in Table 3.2 were estimated using three-year averages (the most 
current three years of data) rather than using cross-section/time-series analysis, 
as was employed in Table 3.2. The resulting coefficients were nearly quantita-
tively identical to those reported in Table 3.2.
   We also estimated the models in Table 3.2 by including firm size as a regres-
sor. It was statistically significant and negative in the left and center specifications 
of Table 3.2; its inclusion did not change any of the signs of the other regressors 
but did increase the magnitude of the MGTCULT, EPDEG, and DOWNSIZE coefficients, 
while slightly reducing the coefficients for EPDM, EPFR, and INFOSHR. We exclude 
it from our preferred estimation because of concern for potential endogeneity in 
the model (since firm size is also in the denominator of the dependent variable).
   Finally, interactions in the claim frequency reported below between the 
DOWNSIZE dummy variable and HRM practices were statistically insignificant 
(partially, of course, because of the small sample sizes).
 2.  The statistics here pertain to the larger claims denial regression sample. Howev-
er, the smaller duration sample has mean statistics (for the independent variables) 
very close to those reported in Table 3.1.
 3.  There were seven occupational-dummy variables, seven year-dummy variables, 
and eight industry-dummy variables included in the model. There were also 
dummy variables for the following injury types: back sprain and strain, other 
sprains and strains, fractures, contusions and concussions, and lacerations. 
 4.  $175.50 was the average in 1996 for our sample. 1998 and 1997 data were judged 
to have too many open claims to be used as a measure of costs per worker: 1998 
had 52 percent of claims still open, while 1997 had 45 percent of claims still 
open. For 1996, only 12.6 percent of claims were open. We didn’t use earlier 
years (with still fewer open claims) because of a concern that they might be less 
relevant for the survey results and because of cost-of-living differences.
 5.  The expected weekly benefit depends on the legislated maximum and minimum 
benefits, the replacement rate (these three benefit parameters are determined by 
the individual state legislatures), and the worker’s wage rate. Since maximum 
benefit payments are low enough that most workers are constrained by the maxi-
mum weekly benefit, a change in any HR practice won’t affect the benefit they 
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receive—they will get the legislated maximum payment. However, workers be-
low the maximum may have their benefits indirectly affected by the HR practices 
that are adopted if they value those practices. Workers who value the work en-
vironment generated by some of these HR practices, and whose weekly benefit 
would be below the maximum legislated benefit level, will take an implicit wage 
reduction because of the valued HR practices. Furthermore, because of the wage 
reduction, they will have their benefits indirectly affected by the presence of the 
HR practice. The size of the implied wage reductions necessary to fund the HR 
practices considered would not be enough to substantially alter the conclusions 
in Table 3.6. The greatest wage reductions, for example, would be for employer’s 
share of profit sharing (or, perhaps, health and pension contributions). If this 
leads to a 3 percent reduction in wages, expected benefits would fall (for those 
between the minimum and maximum benefit levels) by 2 percent. Such a change 
is dwarfed by the changes given in Table 3.4. Finally, even if these changes are 
more substantial than we anticipate, note that they work to reinforce the conclu-
sions drawn concerning the outcomes in Table 3.4, as they tend to further reduce 
workers’ compensation costs.
 6.  Hunt et al. (1993) reach similar conclusions. In their survey, active safety leader-
ship, safety diligence, proactive RTW program, and safety training proxy some 
of the same dimensions that we have included under Management Safety Cul-
ture. In their study, they also find that these are effective mechanisms through 
which to promote health and safety, and their empirical data suggest that there 
is also a relative abundance of variation in these practices across their sample of 
relatively large firms (Hunt et al. 1993, Table 4.2).
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Reduced Moral Hazard 
or Increased Efficiency? 
Evidence from Claim Types and Claim Denials 
The distinction made between the direct and indirect effects of 
HRM practices in the last chapter is not only intrinsically interesting, it 
suggests that HRM practices do not simply reduce claims-reporting risk 
(a change in the reporting of claims, even where real risk is held con-
stant) but rather reduce real risk (through lowering the degree of intrin-
sic physical risk of employee risk-taking behavior). In Chapter 1 we ar-
gued that HRM practices may change real risk by more fully involving 
employees in the firm’s strategic decision making or financial returns. 
Either of these measures increases employees’ incentives to design and 
implement safety policies that improve workplace efficiency or at least 
help reduce impediments to the flow of information about safety risks 
between the firm and the employees. We explore this intriguing pos-
sibility further in this chapter by examining how HRM policies affect 
claim denials and the distribution of injury risks.
CLAIMS-REPORTING AND RISK-BEARING MORAL 
HAZARD
In the last chapter, we found that HRM practices reduce claim dura-
tion and, generally, claim frequency. However, this indicates nothing 
about whether the effect represents a reduction in real risk taking or 
simply a reduction in the propensity to report a claim. The former is 
called risk-bearing moral hazard while the latter is known as claims-
reporting moral hazard (Butler and Worrall 1991). Though either kind 
of moral hazard increases an employer’s costs, the distinction between 
risk-bearing and claims-reporting moral hazard has important implica-
tions for resource allocation. If changes in claim frequency and claim 
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duration stem purely from the effects of reporting, without any change 
in the degree of intrinsic physical risk, then we would not expect to see 
changes in compensating wages for unreimbursed wage losses.1 Fur-
ther, if it is a pure reporting effect, then changes in safety programs or 
ergonomic standards are likely to have little impact on workers’ com-
pensation costs. If increases in workers’ compensation costs are driven 
by reporting effects, additional expenditures may be more productive 
as subsidies to pension benefits or wellness programs than as increases 
in safety training.
The estimated direct effects in the previous chapter only indicate 
that downsizing increases workers’ compensation claim duration and 
that most HRM practices decrease workers’ compensation costs. These 
estimates do not indicate whether the corresponding changes in work-
ers’ compensation outcomes are a result of changes in the propensity to 
report claims or a result of changes in the degree of risk-taking behavior 
of workers. The propensity to report claims would be affected if par-
ticipation in strategic decision making or in the firm’s financial returns 
internalized safety costs to the employee so that he made the same de-
cisions he would make if he were spending his own money. If claims-
reporting behavior were important, then as employee participation in 
decision making and financial returns increased, the impact of downsiz-
ing on claim frequency or claim duration would fall. In other words, we 
would expect negative and statistically significant interactions between 
Downsizing and various HRM practices. This suggests that we may 
find some evidence on the reporting versus real risk explanations of cost 
changes by examining indirect evidence—that is, evidence besides the 
main HRM and Downsizing effects. 
Some indirect evidence was provided in Table 3.5 of the last chap-
ter, though it was not discussed as a test for claims-reporting moral 
hazard. To test the claims-reporting versus risk-bearing explanations 
using Table 3.5 coefficient estimates, we have to assume either that 
downsizing increases workers’ compensation claim duration because it 
is a reporting effect (this is the traditional explanation in the empirical 
literature) or that downsizing represents a change in real risk that is due 
to job stress or job fatigue as the work pace increases. We now explore 
both of these interpretations of Table 3.5.
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Downsizing outcomes as a claims-reporting effect. In the midst 
of downsizing, there are a number of reasons to suspect claims-report-
ing moral hazard, particularly if the claimant believes that he may be 
one of those losing a job. Workers’ compensation claim status is pre-
ferred to unemployment insurance claim status for a number of reasons: 
workers’ compensation benefits are higher than unemployment insur-
ance benefits; workers’ compensation benefits are tax-free and unem-
ployment insurance benefits are not; and workers’ other fringe benefits 
continue while they receive workers’ compensation benefits, whereas 
there are few, if any, fringe benefits for unemployed workers. If the 
Downsizing effect is a reporting effect, HRM practices that increase 
employee involvement should mitigate these responses.
Downsizing outcomes as a risk-bearing effect. In this case, em-
ployment volatility and longer work hours associated with downsizing 
would either increase the intrinsic workplace risk or induce workers to 
change their risk-bearing behaviors. Downsizing would increase claim 
frequency, but this impact would be mitigated in those firms with better 
work safety conditions.2 Since higher values of the Management Safety 
Culture variable (management’s commitment to workplace safety) indi-
cate better safety environments, then if risk-bearing moral hazard is re-
flected in the Downsizing effect, there should be a negative interaction 
between Management Safety Culture and Downsizing. Safer workplac-
es will reduce the risk-bearing effects associated with Downsizing.
The evidence. The Management Safety Culture × Downsizing in-
teraction in Table 3.5 of Chapter 3 (MGTCULT × DOWNSIZE), instead of be-
ing statistically significant and negative, is insignificant and positive, as 
are many of the other HRM interactions reported in Table 3.5. The sole 
exception is the Employee Participation in Financial Returns × Down-
sizing interaction (EPFR × DOWNSIZE). Three out of the six interactions 
are positive in the preferred, right-hand specification with the control 
variables, and one of these is significant at the 0.10 level. This supports 
neither the claims-reporting moral hazard nor the risk-bearing moral 
hazard explanation of why downsizing increases workers’ compensa-
tion claim durations. 
However, our tests for claims-reporting and risk-bearing moral haz-
ard may suffer from specification bias: the functional form may not 
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be the correct one, or there may be omitted factors not included in the 
claim duration and claim frequency regressions. So in this chapter we 
present two additional tests for detecting moral hazard effects that have 
been used previously in the workers’ compensation literature. We ex-
amine whether claim denial rates are affected by HRM practices, and 
we examine whether the type of claims (i.e., hard-to-monitor claims 
versus easy-to-monitor claims) varies with HRM practices. 
If, for example, more financial involvement in the firm reduces 
claim frequency by a reduction in moral hazard, then we would expect 
that more employee financial involvement would also reduce the num-
ber of claim denials on the part of firms. Similarly, since claim-report-
ing moral hazard is most likely to occur in difficult-to-monitor claims 
such as back sprains and strains, we would expect that firms offering 
more financial rewards linked to workers’ productivity would experi-
ence relatively fewer back strain claims as the moral hazard–induced 
reporting of those claims falls. We examine the empirical evidence as-
sociated with these predictions in the next two sections.
CLAIM DENIAL RESULTS
Our hypothesis is that claims seen by the insurer, or firm, as poten-
tial claims-reporting moral hazard behavior are more likely to be de-
nied. We expect that the implementation of safety strategies and worker 
involvement will ameliorate concerns over claims-reporting moral haz-
ard. Hence, in this section we estimate the following logistic claim de-
nial regression:
(4.1)      log    claim denial     = Xβ + Mδ + Hγ + Dα
         1 − claim denial
 
where claim denial is the probability that a given claim will be denied 
by the firm, M represents Management Safety Culture, H represents 
other HRM variables, D represents Downsizing, and X represents the 
remaining control variables in the analysis.
The descriptive statistics for the claim denial analysis are given in 
Table 4.1 and are the same as those given in Table 3.3 in the last chap-
ter. The logistic regressions in Table 4.2 compute the likelihood that a 
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workers’ compensation claim will be denied. Here we will discuss only 
the results in the right-hand column since this value is the specification 
that includes the industry, occupational, injury, and year dummy vari-
ables. The difference in the specification with and without the control 
variables is modest: the coefficients are generally of the same sign and 
magnitude but often lose some significance in the presence of other 
control variables.
Among the claimant characteristics, only Maleness (MALE) and the 
Wage Replacement Rate (LnRRATE) have significant impacts: being male 
increases the likelihood of having one’s claim denied by 3.5 percent-
age points, and increasing the replacement rate by 10 percent increases 
the likelihood of having one’s claim denied by 2.3 percentage points 
(using the right-hand column estimates). This latter benefits effect is 
an expected moral hazard result: the higher the replacement rate, the 
greater the incentive to report a claim and the more likely that it will 
be denied. Downsizing in the firm also has the expected positive coef-
ficient but is statistically insignificant in either specification in Table 
4.2. The insignificant coefficient for Downsizing in the claims denial 
regression suggests that it may not be a good proxy for claims-report-
ing (or risk-bearing) moral hazard in this sample. This insignificance 
also suggests that our interpretation of the interaction effects in the last 
section as indicators of moral hazard response is probably not a very 
discerning test.
Nonetheless, if firms perceive that there is a significant amount of 
claims-reporting moral hazard taking place, then the existence of HRM 
practices that increase job satisfaction or a worker’s financial commit-
ment to the firm ought to be associated with lower claim denial rates 
(Card and McCall 1996). That is, the HRM practice variables ought to 
have negative coefficients. However, the HRM coefficients offer mixed 
results. Only three of the five coefficients are negative. Moreover, in 
the preferred specification given in the right-hand column of Table 4.2 
only the financial returns variable (EPFR) is statistically significant at the 
0.10 (but not the 0.05) level. This suggests that the reductions in claim 
severity due to HRM practices are not exclusively the result of reduced 
moral hazard. If they were, then more of these HRM practices would be 
associated with fewer claim denials.3




Table 4.1  Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev.
Dependent variables
NWSPELL Duration of nonwork spell: days of temporary total disability benefits paid in 
the workers’ compensation systema
55.78 140.91




DOWNSIZE A dummy variable coded 1 if the claimant’s company experienced layoffs or 
cutbacks in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
HRM variables
EPDM Number of employee participation programs in decision-making process 3.12 1.36
EPFR Number of employee participation programs in the firm’s financial returns 3.08 2.16
MGTCULT Score of management’s commitment to workplace safety 22.62 2.29
EPDEG Score of the degree of employee participation in the company’s decision-
making process
8.12 1.00
INFOSHR Score of the degree to which management shares information with employees 
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MALE A dummy variable coded 1 if claimant is male, 0 if female 0.53 0.50








SELF A dummy variable coded 1 if claimant’s company is self-insured for its 
workers’ compensation coverage
0.29 0.45
a Descriptive statistics of variables without taking logs.
b The dependent variable NWSPELL is transformed into logarithmic form in the LIFEREG function of SAS. 
c Real wage replacement rate was used to capture both wage and expected workers’ compensation benefit effects on the dependent 
variable. In accordance with the Minnesota workers’ compensation law, RATE was calculated by the following formula (Minnesota WC 
income benefit schedule used; 1992 analysis of workers’ compensation laws, U.S. Chamber of Commerce):
 RATE = MAXt / Wage if  (Wage × 0.66) ≥ MAX
  0.66  if [MINt ≤ (Wage × 0.66) < MAX]
  MINt / Wage if [(MINt × 0.66) ≤ (Wage × 0.66) < MINt]
  1 otherwise,
 where Wage is average production employee’s gross weekly wage, MAXt is maximum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota 
workers’ compensation system, and MINt is minimum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota workers’ compensation system. 
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Table 4.2 Logit Estimates of Claim Denials in the Workers’ 
Compensation System (standard error in parentheses)
Dependent variable: incidence of claim denial in 
the Minnesota workers’ compensation system

















































Industry dummies no yes
Injury type dummies no yes
Occupation dummies no yes
Year dummies no yes
−2 log likelihood 3226.74 2858.64
n 3356 3104
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed test); *** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
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CLAIM TYPES: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ANALYSIS
If HRM practices lower moral hazard behavior, HRM practices 
ought to have an impact on the type of claims that are filed. If the po-
tential for moral hazard is greatest where the costs of monitoring are 
largest, then relatively more evidence of moral hazard should be seen 
with respect to those types of claims that are most difficult to monitor. 
Again, this is especially true for sprains, strains, and cumulative trauma 
conditions.
Detecting moral hazard incentives by comparing difficult-to-moni-
tor injuries with easy-to-monitor injuries was previously employed by 
Smith (1990) and by Dionne and St-Michel (1991). In analyzing the 
times when claims have been filed, Smith raises the possibility that 
workers’ compensation may be paying for some off-the-job injuries. 
Smith argues that off-the-job injuries reported as work-related would 
probably be difficult to diagnose, relatively easy to conceal, and would 
be reported early in the shift, especially on Mondays (the so-called Mon-
day morning syndrome). He finds that of the three largest categories of 
claims, sprains and strains are reported earlier in the day. Moreover, the 
propensity to report sprains and strains earlier in the day is significantly 
increased on Mondays and Tuesdays following a three-day weekend. 
Smith estimates that 4 percent of sprains and strains are misrepresented 
as having occurred on the job. Card and McCall (1996) don’t dispute 
Smith’s findings in their analysis of Minnesota data, but they discount 
the moral hazard interpretation of the findings since employers did not 
increase claim denials for those claims filed on Monday, as would be 
expected if the additional filings were related to claims-reporting moral 
hazard.
Dionne and St-Michel (1991) examine moral hazard by looking at 
the variation in days on workers’ compensation for those with difficult-
to-diagnose conditions compared to those with less-difficult-to-diag-
nose conditions. They partition injuries into two categories based on in-
jury severity (minor injuries with fewer lost days or major injuries with 
greater lost days) and whether the condition is easy or more difficult to 
diagnose. Like Smith (1990), they reason that moral hazard response 
will be greatest for the difficult-to-diagnose injuries: lower back pain 
(minor injury) and spinal disorder (major injury). They find that as Que-
bec’s coinsurance rates decreased in 1979, days workers spent off work 
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on a difficult-to-diagnose claim rose significantly more than did days 
from claims falling into the easy-to-diagnose category. They also found 
that, once the interaction with diagnostic difficulty was controlled for, 
the 1979 shift in coinsurance rates had no independent effect on days 
on a claim. That is, most of the impact the declining coinsurance rates 
had on days on a claim came through an increase in days consumed by 
those with difficult-to-diagnose injuries.
Butler, Durbin, and Helvacian (1996) use this distinction between 
difficult-to-monitor and easy-to-monitor injuries to explore whether 
soft-tissue injury claims correlate with level of benefits and spread of 
HMOs. They find in their 10-year, 15-state sample of workers’ com-
pensation claims that the proportion of claims attributable to soft-tissue 
injuries rose from 44.7 percent of all claims in 1980 to 50.6 percent in 
1989. Concurrently, the share of costs attributable to soft-tissue injuries 
rose from 41 percent to 48.8 percent. The share of costs for injuries that 
crush or fracture a bone—easy-to-monitor claims—is the only category 
that declined between 1980 and 1989. Using a multinomial logit model, 
the authors determine that most of the increase in soft-tissue injury is 
attributable to the expansion of HMOs. Specifically, they ascribe the 
rise in such injuries to moral hazard response by HMO providers, who 
increase their revenue by classifying as work-related injuries as many 
health conditions as possible.4
We build on the work done by Butler, Durbin, and Helvacian (1996) 
by considering whether HRM practices affect the distribution of inju-
ries. Given prior evidence on soft-tissue sprain and strain, we would 
expect to see additional HRM practices associated with fewer sprains 
and strains (particularly back sprains and strains), and with relatively 
more fractures and lacerations, if HRM practices are reducing work-
place injuries through a claims-reporting response. 
The effect of Management Safety Culture on risk-bearing moral 
hazard is not as clear as the effect of other HRM practices on claims-
reporting moral hazard. An increase in risk-bearing moral hazard may 
increase any of the claim categories, so the change in injury types that 
is attributable to a reduction in risk-bearing moral hazard is ambiguous. 
Hence, the Management Safety Culture variable, which of all the HRM 
variables most directly impacts the degree of risk-bearing moral hazard, 
will have an ambiguous sign across the four injury groups.
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On the other hand, if HRM practices work to reduce claims-report-
ing moral hazard, we would expect to find them reducing the propor-
tion of back sprains and strains and increasing the relative number of 
fractures, contusions, and cuts. 
To place the ideas discussed above into a statistical framework, we 
assume the typical worker experiences one of five states. The worker 
may not have any type of health impairment whatsoever, or the worker 
may experience some sort of injury that places him into one of four 
injury categories: 1) fractures, contusions, and cuts; 2) back sprains and 
strains; 3) nonback sprains and strains; and 4) all others.
Conditional on gender, age, the insurance benefit replacement 
rate, and whether the firm is self-insured, a probability distribu-
tion describes the likelihood of being in each of these five states. 
Because of moral hazard response, the marginal worker will mi-
grate from one state to another when there is an incentive to do so. 
In particular, as financial rewards increase through profit sharing and 
other forms of financial returns, or job satisfaction increases through 
greater involvement with firm decision making, then the utility- 
maximizing worker is less likely to migrate to the difficult-to-diagnose 
(and easy-to-feign) category of back sprains and strains. The HRM ef-
fects on back sprains and strains will be negative, and the HRM effects 
on fractures will be positive (or at least, more positive than they are for 
lower back sprains and strains).
Since data are available only on workers who report claims, the 
noninjured state is omitted. The stochastic specification employed be-
low implies that the parameter estimates will be unchanged by such an 
omission; the odds ratio implied by a multinomial logit model main-
tains the independence of irrelevant alternatives, thus the parameter 
estimates will be consistent.5 The categorical dependent variable identi-
fies one of the four groups of injuries above. Although the parameters 
for other sprains and strains (nonback) are necessarily normalized, the 
implied impact of the HRM variables on nonback sprains and strains is 
given in Table 4.4.
The multinomial logit model used in this analysis assumes that the 
injured worker’s perceived wellness, or utility, is given by
 
(4.2) Uij = U(Wij , Sij ) = Xi  βj + εij ,
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where Wij represents financial incentives of the worker and Sij repre-
sents nonwage dimensions of work (i.e., the worker’s involvement with 
firm decision making) of worker i in claimant status j. The vector Xi 
includes factors that determine financial and nonfinancial aspects of the 
job and is assumed to be constant across claimant states. The vector of 
coefficients, βj , and the random error term, εij , vary by claimant status. 
Note that this is a more general model than is typically employed in the 
literature, where only utility in the injured versus noninjured states is 
considered.
Consider the marginal worker who chooses to file a back sprain or 
strain claim. The worker follows this pattern because he derives more 
utility from it than from any of the other alternatives: presumably the 
other claim types do not yield as much utility given the firm’s financial 
and nonfinancial dimensions, and the utility he gets while on a sprain or 
strain claim (which we will denote as state “1”) is higher than it would be 
if he worked (state “W,” with the other injury states labeled 2, 3, and 4). 
Thus, the probability of observing a worker on a sprain or strain claim is 
 
(4.3) Pi1= Pr [(Ui1 > Uiw )  (Ui1 > Ui2 )  (Ui1 > Ui3 )  (Ui1 > Ui4 )]
    = Pr [(Xi β1 − Xi βw > εiw − εi1 )
   (Xi β1 − Xi β2 > εi2 − εi1 )
   (Xi β1 − Xi β3 > εi3 − εi1 )
   (Xi β1 − Xi β4 > εi4 − εi1 )] .
Similar expressions hold for the other three claimant states.
Assuming that the underlying distributions of εij are type I extreme-
value-distributed, the probability of observing the ith worker in claim-
ant status j is
(4.4)    Pij =
        exp (Xi βj)




Butler&Park.indb   72 6/22/2005   11:51:47 AM
Reduced Moral Hazard or Increased Efficiency?   73
We define a set of four dummy variables such that 
 Yij = 1 if the ith worker files claim type j ;
 Yij = 0 otherwise.
Then, the log-likelihood function for the model is
(4.5)    log l = ∑ ∑ Yij log Pij .
Maximizing this equation yields estimates of the parameters βj for 
the three claim types relative to the omitted claim category, “All other 
claims.”
Note that the coefficients of the multinomial logit function do not 
represent the marginal effects of the independent variables on claim 
choice. However, the coefficients may be converted to measures of 
marginal effects and, for ease of comparison among the variables, ex-
pressed as semi-elasticities using well-established formulas: 
 
(4.6a)    
∂Pj / Pj  = βmj − ∑ βmk  Pk     for  j = 1,2,3 ;
                 ∂Pj
(4.6b)    
∂Pj / Pj  =  − ∑ βmk  Pk     for  j = 4 .
                 ∂Xj
In Equations (4.6a) and (4.6b), k and j are indices across the four 
claim types, while m is an index across the explanatory variables in 
Xi.6 The control variables in this analysis are gender, age, the worker 
replacement rate, and whether the worker’s firm self-insures.
Table 4.3 presents the sample means for the 3,104 claimants em-
ployed by firms in our sample data: 11 percent are fractures, contu-
sion, or cuts; 21 percent are back sprains or strains; 18 percent are other 
sprains or strains; and 49 percent are all other injury types. The means 
for the independent variables are about the same as those in Table 3.3 
of the last chapter. This claimant sample has slightly more males than 
females, an average age of 40, relatively low reported average weekly 
wages, and a relatively high replacement rate. Across the injury types, 
the claimants show little variation in HRM practices among their firms 
except for Employee Participation in Financial Returns (EPFR) and In-
formation Sharing (INFOSHR), where the standard deviation is signifi-
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NOTE: See Table 3.3 for data sources and calculations.
a  Based on parameter estimates reported in Table 4.5.
b The standard errors given for the elasticities are asymptotic approximations based on the estimated standard errors in Table 4.5. 
Therefore, the standard errors for the elasticities are a much less reliable indicator of the statistical significance of a particular variable 
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cantly larger than it is for the other HRM practices. For both of these 
HRM practices, claimants with back sprains work in firms with fewer 
financial returns programs (2.75 for back sprains versus 3.24 across all 
injury types) and with less information sharing (20.64 for back sprains 
versus 21.42 across all injury types). This is consistent with the claims-
reporting moral hazard information of claims filing: in firms with fewer 
HRM practices, more hard-to-monitor (lower back sprain) claims are 
filed. However, these raw descriptive differences do not necessarily 
measure the influence of HRM practices: other confounding variables 
may be simultaneously influencing injury types.
To control for these other potentially confounding variables, we use 
a multinomial logit model in which the type of claim filed is made a 
function of the same variables used in the analysis of claim duration in 
the last chapter. The multinomial logit estimates of the first three claim 
types in Table 4.3, relative to the “other sprains and strains” category, 
are reported in Table 4.5 for 3,104 claims for which we have complete 
data on the HRM practice, demographic, and occupational and industry 
control variables. The chi-square statistics in Table 4.5 indicate that the 
Downsizing variable and two of the HRM practice variables, Employ-
ee Participation in Financial Returns (EPFR) and Information Sharing 
(INFOSHR), are statistically insignificant, while the degree and intensity 
of Employee Participation in Decision Making (EPDEG and EPDM) and 
Management Safety Culture (MGTCULT) variables are significant.
Since the multinomial logit coefficients do not represent the mar-
ginal effects of different characteristics on the probability of making a 
particular type of claim, we transform the coefficients to partial deriva-
tives and, for ease of comparison, express the coefficients as semi-elas-
ticities. These semi-elasticities, with their approximate standard errors 
in parentheses, are reported in Table 4.4. The semi-elasticities provide 
only weak evidence of claims-reporting moral hazard. Consistent with 
the explanation that HRM practices lower workers’ compensation costs 
by decreasing claims-reporting hazard, an increase in any of the four 
HRM practices (except Management Safety Culture) lowers the likeli-
hood of a lower back sprain claim being filed. For example, adding an-
other program that involves the worker in firm decision making (EPDM 
increases by 1) will lower the likelihood of a lower back sprain claim 
being filed by 1.5 percent. Adding another program that increases the 
worker’s involvement in the financial returns of the company lowers the 
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Table 4.4   Semi-Elasticity Estimates of the Effects of Human Resource 
Policies on the Type of Injurya : Multinomial Logit Regressionb 







































































































NOTE: The specification also includes dummy variables for years, industry, and workers’ 
occupation, but the corresponding coefficients are not reported here. While none of 
these control variables were statistically significant individually, log-likelihood ratio 
tests indicate that they were jointly significant at greater than the 0.01 level.
a Based on parameter estimates reported in Table 4.5.
b The standard errors given for the elasticities are asymptotic approximations based 
on the estimated standard errors in Table 4.5. Therefore, the standard errors for 
the elasticities are a much less reliable indicator of the statistical significance of a 
particular variable than are the chi-square tests given in Table 4.5.
 SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.5  The Effects of Human Resource Policies on the Type of Injury: 








All other types 

















































































NOTE: Total number of injuries was 3,104; −2 log likelihood = 7303.86. * significant 
at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); 
*** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
The specification also includes dummy variables for years, industry, and workers’ 
occupation, but the corresponding coefficients are not reported here. While none of 
these control variables were statistically significant individually, log-likelihood ratio 
tests indicate that they were jointly significant at better than the 0.01 level.
a  The omitted injury type is “Other sprain and strain.”
b Chi-square statistics for each variable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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likelihood of a lower back sprain claim being filed by 1.1 percent. The 
moral hazard explanation implies an ambiguous impact for the Man-
agement Safety Culture coefficient, and it is the only HRM practice that 
is not negative.
However, the evidence that HRM practices reduce claims-report-
ing moral hazard is ambiguous for two reasons. First, HRM effects on 
lower back sprains are empirically small (i.e., the semi-elasticities are 
small in magnitude). While the EPDM and EPDEG are statistically signifi-
cant (see Table 4.5 in the right-hand column for the test of joint signifi-
cance), the switch away from the potentially moral-hazard-laden lower 
back sprain category as these programs increase is too small to account 
for the magnitude of effect reflected in the HRM reduction of workers’ 
compensation costs in Tables 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6 of Chapter 3. 
Second, the multinomial estimates provide no corroborative evi-
dence of moral hazard behavior with regard to other (non-HR) results: 
Downsizing has no impact on claim types, increases in the replacement 
rate do not increase the proportion of lower back sprains, and self-in-
surance does not lower the proportion of lower back sprains. As the 
replacement rate increases, the opportunity cost of being out of work 
on a workers’ compensation claim falls. Claims-reporting moral hazard 
will likely increase, especially for injuries (such as lower back sprains) 
whose work origin is difficult to monitor or detect. Hence, an increase 
in claims-reporting moral hazard ought to increase the proportion of 
low back sprains. 
Similarly, firms that self-insure their workers’ compensation claims 
have the greatest incentive to monitor claims for moral hazard behavior 
since they bear the full cost of such behavior, whereas firms that are 
not fully experience-rated do not. For this reason, if claims-reporting 
moral hazard were significant, we would expect those firms that self-in-
sure to have relatively fewer lower back claims. However, proportion-
ately fewer lower back claims are filed for those firms that have higher 
replacement rates or that do not self-insure. Hence, the Downsizing 
(DOWNSIZE), Benefit Replacement Rate (RRATE), and Firm’s Self-Insured 
Status (SELF) coefficients have the opposite impact on the filing of lower 
back sprains if the filing of lower back sprains mostly reflects moral 
hazard behavior.
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CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter 1, we noted that HRM practices can affect any one of 
the three dimensions of reported injury loss. First, they can affect the 
propensity to file a claim, even if the intrinsic workplace risk remains 
unchanged. Workers’ reporting propensities are affected by the degree 
of insurance coverage, so there is a claims-reporting moral hazard. In-
trinsic risk is the level of physical danger of accidental injury or oc-
cupational disease that is the result of workers’ producing output, and 
injury costs may be reduced by modifying either or both of the follow-
ing: by changing workers’ incentives to take care (through changes in 
risk-bearing moral hazard), or by modifying the ergonomic aspects of 
the physical workplace, including employing processes, procedures, or 
equipment that reduce on-the-job injuries. 
 We have given three explanations for our findings of the last two 
chapters of why HRM practices reduce workers’ compensation costs:
1)  Claims-reporting moral hazard changes with HRM practices,
2)  Risk-bearing moral hazard changes with HRM practices, and
3) Intrinsic risk improves (independent of employees’ change in  
 safety behavior) with HRM practices. 
Our evidence is more supportive of the latter two explanations than 
it is of the first.
Claims-reporting moral hazard. Our findings do not consistently 
support a claims-reporting moral hazard explanation of why HRM prac-
tices reduce workers’ compensation costs. We find no strong evidence 
that the Downsizing effect represents a moral hazard effect, either of the 
risk-bearing or claims-reporting type. Thus it is tenuous to view Down-
sizing or HRM practice interactions as providing tests for moral hazard 
behavior. This is the reason that we also analyzed the impact of HRM 
practices on claim denials and claim types in this chapter.
The analysis of this chapter provides little evidence that HRM prac-
tices operate solely, or mostly, through a reduction in claims-report-
ing moral hazard. The only HRM practice that appears to significantly 
reduce the likelihood of a claim denial is Employee Participation in 
Financial Returns, which, although consistently exhibiting the expected 
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sign in all of the analyses in this book, remains a relatively small effect. 
Employee Participation in Financial Returns is marginally significant in 
the claims denial analysis; Employee Participation in Financial Returns 
is marginally insignificant in the multinomial logit analysis.
All HRM practices do have the expected impact on the filing of 
hard-to-monitor claims (such as lower back sprains and strains) in the 
multinomial logit regression. This is evidence of claims-reporting moral 
hazard. But the estimated effect is small, too small to explain why these 
programs reduce workers’ compensation costs as much as they appear 
to do. Moreover, the coefficients of other ancillary variables that would 
also indicate the presence of claims-reporting moral hazard—DOWNSIZE, 
RRATE, and SELF—do not have the expected sign.
This doesn’t mean that moral hazard isn’t important, only that the 
claims denial and multinomial logit results indicate that HRM practices 
do not reduce workers’ compensation solely, or even mainly, through 
reductions in claims-reporting moral hazard response. 
Risk-bearing moral hazard. The results are also consistent with 
changes in risk-bearing moral hazard. But a risk-bearing moral hazard 
explanation of the HRM impact accommodates the claim denial results 
more readily than does a claims-reporting explanation. With a change in 
the number of real injuries (as might come through a reduction in risk-
bearing moral hazard), there would be no change in claim denials on the 
basis of employee claims-reporting moral hazard since there would be 
no grounds on which to contest the validity of these claims. Moreover, 
changes in workers’ risk-bearing activities would have an ambiguous 
impact on the types of claims filed, hence HRM practices would have 
an indeterminate effect on the distribution of claims even if the HRM 
practices served to change the degree of risk-bearing behavior on the 
part of workers. 
Change in real safety, independent of any change in workers’ 
safety behavior. Besides a change in risk as workers change their risk-
taking behaviors, there can be changes in risk brought about by the intro-
duction of better safety information, better safety practices, better safety 
equipment, and better allocation of labor to heterogeneous tasks even 
if workers don’t change their behavior because of insurance coverage. 
Involvement of workers in strategic safety planning or in the financial 
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returns of the firm leads to more efficient safety outcomes if workers are 
the least-cost provider of safety information and safety processes. This 
explanation would also be consistent with the results reported in this 
book. It seems to us to be a plausible research lead to pursue.
 Notes
 1. Benefits replace only two-thirds of lost wages, subject to a maximum benefit 
(which restricts most potential recipients’ income to less than two-thirds) and a 
waiting period (three days in Minnesota) during which no benefits are received. 
Moreover, there are no benefits paid for pain and suffering.
 2.  Claim duration may rise or fall, depending on whether the change in claim 
frequency substantially shifts the relative number of short- and long-duration 
claims. If this composition effect is small, we would expect the average claim 
duration to increase with downsizing as injury severity increases with injury 
risk. 
 3.  Logistic regressions for claim denials with Downsizing interaction variables 
were also estimated, analogously to the duration estimates in Table 3.3 of the 
last chapter. However, none of the interactions were statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level (and none at all in the full model with the control variables). These 
results are not reported here.
 4.  Butler, Hartwig, and Gardner (1997) find, in a panel data set of selected states 
followed during the 1980s, that HMOs indeed have a greater tendency to clas-
sify claims as compensable under workers’ compensation than do independent 
physicians. Their findings suggest that real workers’ compensation costs might 
have declined during the period except for the rapid expansion of HMOs and 
the perverse incentives generated by the potential dual coverage (i.e., workers’ 
compensation or the per-capitated plan) of various health conditions.
 5.  See the discussion in Maddala (1983), especially p. 77.
 6.  Standard errors for the semi-elasticity estimates are computed by taking square 
roots of the diagonal elements of the matrix ZSZ ', where S = Cov(βij) and
          1−P1 −P2 −P3
Z  =     −P1    1−P2 −P3             Ik . −P1 −P2      1−P3
 −P1 −P2 −P3
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CAUTIONS AND OUR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Our results are conditioned on the sample we employed: medium-
sized and small firms. Most of the firms were concerned with safety. In 
this regard, we believe that our sample is representative of small-to-me-
dium-sized firms. Our survey response rate was relatively high. Even 
though our survey instrument measured more dimensions of safety 
management than any previous study, there still may be omitted fac-
tors—factors for which we do not have any controls. This is a possible 
shortcoming in every study that does not employ completely random 
assignment, and one we hope we have minimized here by employing a 
rather extensive list of firm management and safety factors. And while 
our sample consists of those firms that applied to the Minnesota Safety 
Grant Program, we have no reason to believe that these firms are sub-
stantially different from firms in general. Nevertheless, our results are 
strictly valid for only those firms included in our sample.
Job requirements, both for the firms in our sample and for the Unit-
ed States, have become increasingly specialized. This specialization has 
taken place not only in the levels of technical know-how required but in 
the organizational tools specific to each firm. Loss of skilled labor in the 
competitive marketplace can be especially costly, as it often takes two 
to six months to train new workers. Firms that can retain their skilled 
workers in productive employment have a competitive advantage over 
those that cannot. While there has been a lot written on the importance 
of maintaining skilled employees by reducing job leaving, it is rarely 
noted that firm-specific human capital is also lost when employees tem-
porarily leave because of workers’ compensation claims.
In this study we analyze the impact of various human resource man-
agement practices on a firm’s workers’ compensation costs. We parti-
tioned HRM practices into two groups: 1) practices that the firm can 
unilaterally adopt that do not necessarily involve the workers in either 
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the financial or the strategic management of the firm, and 2) practices 
that increase workers’ involvement with the firm in one or both of these 
dimensions. Among the former, known as management environmental 
factors, we include Management Safety Culture (MGTCULT, the degree of 
management involvement with the safety efforts of the firm) and Infor-
mation Sharing (INFOSHR) as variables. Among the latter group of HRM 
practices, those with explicit worker involvement, we have three vari-
ables to approximate different dimensions of employee participation: 
1) the number of programs that allow the employee to participate in 
the financial returns of the company (EPFR), 2) the number of programs 
that allow the employee to participate in the strategic planning of the 
company (EPDM), and 3) the intensity of the employee’s involvement in 
the strategic planning of the company (EPDEG).
Of these five dimensions, we find that greater information sharing 
by management and greater intensity in the firm’s strategic planning by 
employees raises rather than lowers workers’ compensation costs. In-
creased information sharing by management with employees increases 
claim frequency by as much as it decreases claim duration, so the net 
effect is a small and insignificantly positive increase in costs. The in-
significant net impact on costs is consistent with the results in Chapter 
4: greater information sharing doesn’t increase the likelihood of claim 
denials, as would be expected if there were substantial claims-reporting 
moral hazard, nor is it associated with a shift in the distribution of injury 
types, as would be expected if there were risk-bearing moral hazard 
present.
 On the other hand, the intensity of employee involvement has a 
positive net impact on workers’ compensation costs as a result of a 19 
percent increase in the duration of a claim for each unit increase in the 
intensity index. Since this index measures intensity of worker involve-
ment on a scale of 2 to 10, with higher scores indicating that workers 
feel they “always” have control over their job tasks and “always” par-
ticipate in employee involvement programs, we had hypothesized that 
more intense involvement would lead to lower costs. The opposite ap-
pears to be true. In the samples, the mean intensity scores were around 
8, indicating that employees participate rather intensely in the activities 
at their firm. There are at least two explanations for this unexpected 
result of higher costs: 1) a greater sense of privilege when hurt, and 2) 
more risk taking. The former explanation hinges on a sense of owner-
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ship—meaning a greater sense of entitlement—when an employee gets 
injured, so that he feels justified in taking more time to recover from his 
work injury. The latter explanation has to do with the employee feeling 
that he has more control over his job than he had in the past. Because 
of this feeling of control, he is willing to take more job risks that result 
in more serious injuries. The latter explanation is consistent with the 
results reported in Chapter 4: larger values of the Intensity of Employee 
Participation (EPDEG) don’t increase the likelihood of claim denials, but 
they do significantly shift the distribution of injury claims toward the 
“all other” category, which tends to have longer claim duration.
Increases in any of our three main HRM practices—EPDM, Employ-
ee Participation in Decision Making; EPFR, Employee Participation in 
Financial Returns; and MGTCULT, the level of management involvement 
in the safety processes of the firm—all lead to substantial reductions in 
workers’ compensation costs per employee. In Table 3.6, we measured 
per-employee safety gains both as a unit change in each of these indices 
and as a change to the “best practice” levels. 
As an example of a unit change interpretation of our results, we find 
that if a firm were to go from using two to using three financial return 
programs (EPFR went from 2 to 3), then claim frequency would fall by 
23 percent and claim duration would fall by 13 percent. Lost work-time 
benefit costs would fall by 36 percent (the combined impact of fre-
quency and duration outcomes), which when multiplied by the average 
indemnity cost per employee of $175.50 yields a cost reduction in lost-
time expenses of $63.18 per employee per year. This is the approximate 
reduction in per-employee costs of adding another plan in which the 
employee shares in the financial returns of the company—that is, of 
making a unit change in the HRM practices. 
There is another interpretation of the results: suppose that the firm 
were to go from an average, 50th percentile firm to an 84th percentile 
firm, i.e., to one of the top 16 percent of firms. If “best practice” firms 
were those with the highest 16 percent of EPFR values, what would be 
the change in costs of moving from the 50th percentile to the 84th per-
centile? This change is a one-standard-deviation change in the value of 
the EPFR; in this case, the standard deviation would be a change of ap-
proximately 1.211 more programs. (In such a case, a standard deviation 
change is small because there is little variation across our sample firms 
in the number of financial return programs they offer to employees.) 
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When we add one standard deviation more of EPFR programs to their 
current offerings, then costs fall by 1.211 × $63.18, or by $76.51. 
The best-practice interpretation of our findings is probably the most 
relevant, given the sample variation in these alternative HRM practices 
across firms. As indicated by the far right-hand column in Table 3.6, an 
average firm that becomes a best-practice firm in EPDM saves about $36 
per employee per year, an important level of savings but only half of the 
best-practice savings available from EPFR.
The HRM practice that represents the largest cost savings per em-
ployee is Management Safety Culture. A firm that increases its level of 
involvement from the average to the best-practice level of MGTCULT, a 
variable increase of about 3, saves about $180 per year per employee. 
In a firm with 100 employees, this is an annual savings of $18,000 in 
lost-time pay alone. This is likely to be a lower bound on the benefits 
derived from improving management safety culture. In addition to the 
lost-time pay costs, medical costs will be saved, and employees’ level 
of job satisfaction may well increase as well. Uncompensated wage loss 
and pain and suffering associated with injuries will fall, reducing the 
compensating wages paid to workers. Perhaps equally important in our 
highly skilled labor market, more firm-specific human capital can be 
retained as the number of days out due to injuries falls. 
Since these are potentially significant savings, it is useful to under-
stand which one of three channels they are achieved through: 1) claim 
reductions due to less claims-reporting moral hazard, 2) claim reduc-
tions due to less risk-bearing moral hazard, or 3) claim reductions due 
to more efficient use of safety resources. The empirical models in Chap-
ter 4 were an attempt to sort out these alternative explanations. We find, 
as is consistent with prior research, evidence of claims-reporting moral 
hazard with respect to increases in the replacement rate: claim dura-
tion and claim denials increase with higher benefit replacement ratios. 
However, we find no strong evidence that a higher level of any of the 
HRM practice variables changes employee behavior, whether in regard 
to employees’ willingness to report claims or employees’ willingness to 
bear on-the-job risk. There is some evidence that EPFR is consistent with 
a reduction in risk-bearing moral hazard, but the magnitude of the effect 
is too small to account for the relatively large EPFR effect on costs. Oth-
ers should pursue these questions with larger samples from other states, 
but in the meantime, we are left to conclude that the HRM practice ef-
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fects operate mainly through the third channel: the more management 
and worker involvement there is with the safety processes of the firm, 
the safer the workplace becomes. Safety outcomes improve as safety 
resources are used more efficiently.1 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRMS
The most important HRM best practice was found to be increasing 
management involvement with the safety programs of the firm. The 
measured safety gains associated with the MGTCULT variable are sub-
stantial, enough so that they are likely to be cost-effective when the 
costs associated with these activities are taken into account. Recall that 
MGTCULT is a Likert scale index of responses to the following issues:
1)  management’s support for clear goals and objectives on safety 
and health policy, 
2) management’s leadership in setting goals on safety and health, 
3) management’s interest in safety and health issues as a part of 
the firm’s strategic level of decision making, 
4) management’s willingness to share safety-related information 
with employees, and
5) management’s commitment to reemployment of disabled  
workers and to having a return-to-work program for injured 
employees.
None of the first four characteristics of good management safety 
culture listed involve any significant cost to implement. Only the fifth, 
a commitment to a proactive return-to-work program, may be costly. 
While evidence on the costs of an effective return-to-work program is 
lacking, there is some evidence on its benefits. Hunt et al. (1993), in 
their sample of larger Michigan firms, report that the presence of a pro-
active return-to-work program significantly lowers workers’ compensa-
tion claim rates. Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin (1995) find that all three 
types of job accommodations they measured increase the likelihood of 
a successful return to work for their sample of severely injured workers: 
reduced-hour accommodations had the smallest impact, followed by 
light-work accommodations, and offering modified equipment had the 
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greatest impact on a successful return to work. However, their data did 
not contain any information on the costs of providing such accommoda-
tions. But while the cost-effectiveness of accommodations is not well 
understood, the evidence certainly suggests that there are some benefits 
from having a proactive return-to-work policy in place.
Though employee participation programs also lower workers’ com-
pensation costs, it is more difficult to interpret how cost-effective they 
might be, because we have no measure of the firm’s cost of implement-
ing these programs. At the very least, involvement of workers with the 
decision making of the firm involves time away from the production 
line. This type of forgone output cost may be small, but the firm would 
have to weigh the implicit loss of output against the benefits we esti-
mate here. We think that calculation will be favorable to employee par-
ticipation in decision-making-type programs: only a few workers serve 
on the firm’s safety committee, but our measured per-capita benefits 
from having a committee apply to all workers.
The same cost-benefit concerns apply to EPFR-type programs: clear-
ly there are (perhaps unanticipated) safety benefits from having em-
ployees participate in the financial returns to the firm. But again, these 
would need to be weighed across the costs. Since 401(k), profit-sharing, 
and other such programs are probably instituted for reasons unrelated 
to workplace safety, our findings should tend to confirm their use as a 
cost-effective HRM practice.
The evidence from Chapter 4 strongly suggests that HRM practices 
work not so much by changing workers’ safety behavior but by improv-
ing the safety outcomes of the firm through more efficient use of safety 
resources. Workers apparently are the lowest-cost provider of informa-
tion on safety risk and safety improvements, so integrating workers into 
the strategic planning of the firm and the financial returns of the firm 
lowers workers’ compensation costs. Hence there seem to be two un-
qualified messages from this research: management involvement with 
firm safety is important, and workers—even if the firm chooses not to 
involve them in exactly the types of programs described here—seem to 
provide useful information on safety outcomes when given the chance. 
Both worker and management involvement, in the appropriate context, 
are essential to achieve the optimal level of workplace safety.
Butler&Park.indb   88 6/22/2005   11:51:51 AM
How Much Safety Is Desirable?   89
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS
So far, most disability policy and research—including policy that 
affects and research that examines workers’ compensation programs—
have implicitly assumed that the worker’s role is passive, except pos-
sibly for claims-reporting moral hazard. It has been assumed that only 
the employer can handle the formulation and implementation of effec-
tive workplace safety programs. This research clarifies the potentially 
important role that employees play in workplace safety processes. Hu-
man resource management practices affect safety on the job: the more 
employees are involved with strategic safety decisions and with the fi-
nancial returns of the firm, the lower the workers’ compensation costs 
will be. Moreover, those costs are lowered not only because workers are 
less likely to file an injury claim, but because their involvement in the 
safety process changes workplace risk. It is as if the firm, by involving 
workers, had “hired” cost-effective safety consultants. This should not 
be too surprising; employees engaged in the production process prob-
ably know more about workplace risks than either managers or outside 
consultants.
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POLICY
One of the advantages of focusing on a sample from a single state is 
that workers’ compensation parameters are held constant. Focusing on 
a sample of firms from Minnesota means that we didn’t have to worry 
about differences in benefit schedules, waiting periods, or administra-
tive procedures. This was appropriate given our concentration on dif-
ferences in HRM practices within the workers’ compensation system. 
We have, therefore, nothing to say about how changes in workers’ com-
pensation policy or administration may affect the results reported here, 
except for one obvious implication: any policy or practice in the state’s 
workers’ compensation program that prohibits or discourages the types 
of HRM practices analyzed here would likely be counterproductive.
In other words, in competitive markets, where firms are looking for 
skilled labor and seeking optimal HRM policies (policies that minimize 
the sum of the accident costs, as discussed in Chapter 1), the workers’ 
compensation administrator’s role should be minimal. Administrators 
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should see that benefits are quickly and fairly paid and that firms bear 
the appropriate accident costs under the law. Under these conditions, 
where it is cost-effective, employee participation will occur, and man-
agers will become more involved with the safety processes of their firm. 
However, not all firms are alike: safety committees may be more effec-
tive in some firms than others. Our research does not find that the work-
ers’ compensation or public policy administrator should mandate these 
practices, only that they should not, as a matter of public safety policy, 
prohibit them from being implemented.
Note
 1.  This is not strictly correct, of course, since we only measure some of the ben-
efits of HRM practices in our empirical research. We do not measure all of the 
benefits, perhaps not even the most important benefit (which would be the reten-
tion of productive skilled labor on the job). Nor do we measure any of the costs 
involved in the implementation of these programs. We hope that future research 
can address these issues.
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